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ABSTRACT 
Debate exists in financial markets over whether patterns 
exist in stock prices which can be used to predict future 
prices and to earn excess returns. Proponents of this idea, 
technical traders, view stock prices as following trends and 
exhibiting consistent patterns which can be exploited for 
gain. Fundamental analysts, however, believe that stock 
prices change only in response to the arrival of information 
which occurs randomly and does not generate any predictable 
patterns in stock prices. To fundamental analysts, consistent 
profit can only be gained if investors have access to 
information before everyone else and if they can correctly 
infer the effect of the news on market prices. 
Therefore, the question arises which view of the markets 
is more accurate. In an attempt to answer this question, this 
work will be separated into two parts. The first part will 
ask if predictable patterns in stock prices exist as technical 
traders surmise, or if these patterns are spurious as 
fundamental analysts would hypothesize. The second part will 
ask if profit can be consistently made according to the 
technical traders' rules for pattern trading, or if these 
profits are inconsistent. 
To evaluate the first part, this work uses a Monte Carlo 
experiment to compare the number of times three technical 
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trading patterns are found in four actual stock price series 
to the niimber of times these patterns are found in 
randomly-generated series chosen to mimic the actual stock 
series. The evidence shows that we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that these patterns occur as frequently in the 
random series as they occur in the actual stock series. This 
finding contradicts the beliefs of technical traders. 
To evaluate the second part, this work calculates the 
returns gained from following technical trading rules 
regarding the patterns. Total profit is calculated for each 
stock price series and each pattern assuming an investment of 
$1 million and each trading rule exploited. The evidence 
shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that average 
returns from these trading rules are zero. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Economists have long sought to develop appropriate models 
to predict stock prices. Academic models have not always been 
able to synthesize the diverse prediction methods used on Wall 
Street. Investors generally use two techniques for 
forecasting stock prices: fundamental analysis and technical 
analysis. Under fundamental analysis, the price of a stock 
reflects the value of the underlying company. Changes in 
stock prices are the result of conditions which change the 
value of a company such as the development of a new, 
profitable product. Therefore, company-specific information 
is highly useful to determine the fundamental value of a 
stock. Under technical analysis, the price of a stock depends 
on supply and demand conditions which, analysts claim, are too 
complicated to model and often have no relationship to value. 
Changes in stock prices occur as supply and demand conditions 
change. These market changes, analysts believe, exhibit 
predictable patterns which the analyst can use to forecast 
price movements. Only market data on past prices and volume 
is of significance to the technical trader. 
Although technical traders view stock prices as following 
trends and exhibiting consistent patterns, fundamental 
analysts believe that stock prices change only in response to 
the arrival of relevant information which occurs randomly and 
does not generate any predictable patterns in stock prices. 
To fundamental analysts, any claim to have found consistent 
patterns in prices could only come from data-snooping. 
Technical traders and fundamental analysts also have 
diverse views of the ability of investors to earn excess 
profits in financial markets. According to technical traders, 
since price patterns are consistent, price movements can be 
predicted to a certain degree and profit opportunities 
uncovered. According to fundamental analysts, price changes 
take place solely because information is revealed that there 
is a change in the underlying fundamentals. If this 
information is made public, the stock price changes 
immediately to reflect the news. Therefore, profit can only 
be gained if investors have access to information before 
everyone else and if they can correctly infer the effect of 
the news on market prices. 
Therefore, the question arises which view of the markets 
is more accurate. In an attempt to answer this question, this 
work will be separated into two parts. The first part will 
ask if predictable patterns in stock prices exist as technical 
traders surmise, or if these patterns are spurious as 
fundamental analysts would hypothesize. The second part will 
ask if profit can be consistently made according to the 
technical traders' rules for pattern trading, or if these 
profits are inconsistent. 
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To evaluate the first part, this work will use Monte 
Carlo analysis to compare the number of times three technical 
trading patterns are found in actual stock price series to the 
number of times these patterns are found in randomly-generated 
series chosen to mimic the actual stock series. The evidence 
shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that these patterns 
occur as frequently in the random series as they occur in the 
actual stock series. This finding contradicts the beliefs of 
technical traders. 
To evaluate the second part, this work will calculate the 
returns gained from following technical trading rules 
regarding the patterns. Returns are calculated for each stock 
price series and each pattern assuming an investment of $1 
million and each trading rule exploited. The evidence shows 
that we cannot reject the hypothesis that average returns from 
these trading rules are zero. 
The paper is divided into five parts. Part two is a 
review of the stock price literature and views of how markets 
operate. Part three describes the methods used and part four 
presents and discusses the results. Part five concludes with 
a discussion of extensions of the experiments to other markets 
and other technical trading rules. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review will be divided into three parts. 
The first part examines several views of the financial markets 
and specifically the stock market in order to emphasize the 
debate between fundamental analysts and technical traders. 
The second part examines some of the empirical studies 
conducted and other studies made to support these views. The 
last part provides a brief siammary. 
A. Diverse Views of Financial Markets 
Debate over what drives supply and demand in financial 
markets has been raging since the inception of the markets. 
Professional investors generally fall on one or the other side 
of the debate. They classify themselves as either fundamental 
analysts or technical analysts although many investors use 
some ideas from each school in their analysis. These analysts 
have very different views about how markets operate and how 
best to make predictions about future stock prices. 
One academic view of the stock market noted by Keynes in 193 6 
was more consistent with the technical traders' beliefs. He 
observed that stock valuation is the outcome of the mass 
psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals, subject 
to large fluctuation as the result of changes in opinion due 
to factors which do not really make much difference to the 
prospective yield. 
An alternative view of financial markets, the efficient 
markets hypothesis, became popular among academics in the late 
1960s and 1970s. The efficient markets hypothesis is 
consistent with the fundamental analysts' view of the markets. 
Initial empirical support for the efficient markets hypothesis 
was found by Fama (1965) who described stock prices as 
following a random walk. If stock prices follow a random 
walk, then stock price changes are random and technical 
analysis could be of no use in predicting future prices. As a 
result, technical analysis fell into disrepute. 
However, with mounting evidence against the efficient 
markets hypothesis in the 1980s, economists again began to 
focus their attention on alternative models of financial 
markets which again are more consistent with the technical 
traders' beliefs. These models focus on investors who may 
follow fads or trade on pseudo-signals (noise) when 
determining an investment strategy. 
The following literature review will briefly discuss 
these diverse views of financial markets and then discuss some 
studies of price movements in the stock market and investors' 
behavior. 
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1. The Dow theory and technical analysts' view of the markets 
Technical analysis is considered by many to be the 
original form of investment analysis. It has the view that 
markets are driven by investors who act en masse or according 
to fads and whims and that prices will therefore exhibit 
trends. The objective of using technical analysis is to 
predict future price movements from past price patterns. 
Technical analysts, also known as chartists, believe they can 
use these predictions to earn excess returns in the market. 
Critics believe that technical analysts may have found 
spurious patterns in stock prices due to their intense 
scrutiny of stock prices or data-snooping (Merton, 1987). 
There are many methods of technical analysis. The oldest 
is attributed to Charles Dow who, as far back as the late 
1800s, emphasized tracking stock market trends. The Dow 
Theory, as it is called, takes advantage only of price and 
volume statistics as expressed in certain "averages", deriving 
nothing from the business statistics on which the 
fundamentalists depend. The Dow Theory takes advantage of the 
fact that many stock prices tend to move together and it uses 
stock market indexes to track the major and minor trends of 
those prices. The major upward trends are called bull markets 
and the major downward trends are called bear markets. These 
are extensive up or down movements which usually last for a 
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year or more and result in a general appreciation or 
depreciation in prices of at least 2 0 percent. Dow also 
discussed the observed secondary trends which were temporary 
reversals in position during the major trends. These 
secondairy trends are reported to last from three weeks to 
three months and to cause a change in direction from the major 
trend of about one-third to two-thirds of the previous gain or 
loss. 
Other methods used by chartists include 1) detecting 
certain price patterns which are believed to hold some 
predictive power about reversals in or continuation of trends, 
2) holding only stocks which perform better than a market 
index and eliminating others, 3) using filter techniques 
(e.g., buy when price rises 10% above a low), 4) comparing two 
moving averages where signals to buy and sell occur when a 
short-term moving average crosses a long-term moving average. 
All of these techniques embody the ideas that the market moves 
in discernible trends which continue for significant periods 
and that the technician can use these tools to correctly 
detect changes in trend and take advantage of them. 
Technical traders provide some explanation why trends 
arise (Edwards and Magee, 1992). For example, bull markets 
are explained by the observation that, at the beginning when 
the market is at a low, there are a few, far-sighted 
individuals who forecast better future economic conditions and 
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begin to buy. In general, however, current news is bad and 
other investors are wary. When increasingly better news about 
business begins to attract attention, there is a steady 
advance and increasing activity. Finally, the market booms 
when the "public" begins to buy as a result of all good 
financial news, despite the fact that this may be the wrong 
time to buy. 
In other words, according to technical analysts, trends 
may perpetuate themselves due to the bandwagon effects of 
crowds wanting to join in the rise of a favorite stock and due 
to unequal access to fundamental information about a company 
(Malkiel, 1990). Therefore, according to chartists, investors 
may be irrational--subject to guesses, mood swings--and may 
trade as a group, influenced by mass psychology. 
Technical traders admit that certain fundamental 
information as profits and losses will play a role in 
determining supply and demand for stocks and therefore prices, 
but as Edwards and Magee (1992) explain in their book: 
The market price reflects not only the differing value 
opinions of many orthodox security appraisers, but also 
all the hopes and fears and guesses and moods, rational 
and irrational, of hundreds of potential buyers and 
sellers, as well as their needs and their resources--in 
total, factors which defy analysis and for which no 
statistics are obtainable, but which are nevertheless all 
synthesized, weighed and finally expressed in the one 
precise figure at which a buyer and a seller get together 
and make a deal. (p. 6) 
For the chartist, therefore, price is the key piece of 
information. Forecasts of price changes can be obtained 
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solely by studying market price and volume data rather than 
information about a company or its prospects. The avid 
chartist will even refuse to look at economic and company-
related data, finding them distracting (Dreman, 1977). 
Typically, the price information used by chartists 
includes daily or weekly highs, lows, and closing prices. 
Volume is also tallied as an additional indicator of the 
relative strength of demand to supply. This information can 
be plotted in logarithmic charts and evidence of patterns or 
trends seen by the analyst. In the words of chartists Edwards 
and Magee (1992): 
It has been said that chart interpretation is not a 
science but an art. It is not an exact science, to be 
sure, because it has no rules to which there are not 
exceptions. Its finer points defy expression in rule or 
precept. It requires judgment in appraisal of many 
factors, some of which may seem at times to conflict 
radically with others, (p.13 9) 
Thus, under this form of analysis, one expects to see 
stock price behavior where investors can be irrational and 
where trends and fads matter. Stock prices may exhibit mean-
reverting behavior and are expected to move in predictable 
trends which have been seen in the past and are expected to 
continue in the future. 
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2. The efficient markets hypothesis 
Another view of financial markets, the efficient markets 
hypothesis, became popular among academics in the late 1960s 
and 1970s. The efficient markets hypothesis is consistent 
with the fundamental analysts' view of the markets. It 
hypothesizes that the markets are driven not by trends and 
fads, but rather by the arrival of information. The efficient 
markets hypothesis is the contention that asset prices reflect 
all available information relevant for judging the future 
returns of those assets. Thus, the idea of efficiency here 
refers to the efficiency of information dissemination. 
Analytically, the efficient markets hypothesis states that 
asset prices reflect the fundamental value of an asset. In 
the case of the stock market, the stock price is a rational 
expectation of future expected dividends on the stock 
discounted by the opportunity cost, the risk-free rate of 
return in the case of perfect markets (where investors can 
borrow and lend at the risk-free rate). These expectations 
are conditioned on a predetermined information set available 
to the investors. Since information arrives randomly and is 
expected to have no effect on price, on average, each time 
period, asset prices follow a Martingale process under this 
hypothesis. 
In order to discuss the efficient markets hypothesis and 
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its limitations, it is necessary to discuss the assumptions 
and implications of the model. Under the. hypothesis, market 
participants are assumed to know the underlying model for 
pricing assets so they can detect periods of market over- and 
under-valuation. This may not be true, however. Critics 
state that it is presumptuous to assume that any participants 
can truly know the model since it is still a matter of debate. 
For example, in the foreign exchange market, studies have 
shown that theoretical models of the exchange rate market fail 
to predict short-run changes better than the random walk model 
(Meese and Rogoff, 1983). In the case of the stock market, 
fundamental value is determined as the present value of the 
expectation of each future dividend payment. But these 
expectations are based on forecasts of the future which are 
difficult to discern. Summers (1986) points out that the same 
considerations which make deviations from efficient asset 
jjrices difficult to isolate statistically for econometricians 
make it unlikely that they will be arbitraged away or 
eliminated by speculative trading. Therefore, investors may 
not be able to determine an underlying model from which to 
determine fundamental value and speculation may not ensure 
market prices reflect fundamental values due to these problems 
of identification. Market efficiency may not exist if no one 
knows the fundamental value. 
A second assumption of this hypothesis is that market 
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participants are rational in the sense that they are able to 
determine what effect information has on asset prices and that 
they correctly exploit this information in their trading 
practices. This assumption has also been criticized as 
presumptuous. As Dreman (1977) points out, it is difficult 
even for professionals to correctly interpret information on a 
company. For example, often incomplete information is 
available. Management may describe variables on sales, 
inventories, pricing, or profitability as "so-so" or 
"excellent". The question arises how all market participants 
are able to accurately quantify this information and translate 
it into a notion of fundamental value. Further, these 
participants are also assumed to be able to assess sometimes 
contradictory information on a wide range of businesses. Even 
brokerage houses have professionals who specialize within an 
industry and who often disagree if a company is over- or 
under-valued. 
The implications of the efficient markets hypothesis have 
also been subject to criticism. One implication is that price 
changes take place solely because information is revealed that 
there is a change in the underlying fundamentals. For 
example, investors may receive information about a new product 
developed by a company which is expected to increase future 
profits and dividend payments. This information would be 
expected to generate increased demand for the firm's stock and 
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an increase in the stock price. If prices were to deviate 
from fundamental value, under perfect capital markets, 
arbitrage would occur to bring prices into line. Thus, the 
implication is that news of changes in the underlying 
fundamentals is immediately reflected by a change in market 
prices and that price will not further change until there is 
other fundamental news. 
However, price changes may not always be justified by 
news. Although studies which examined price changes after 
news had been received by the markets generally found that 
prices incorporated news quickly--a point in support of the 
efficient markets hypothesis--other empirical tests turned the 
question around by asking how often price changes are 
justified by news and found contradictory evidence (Cutler et 
al. , 1989) . 
The second implication of the efficient markets 
hypothesis follows from the first. If market prices always 
reflect all available information, it is impossible to earn 
persistent excess returns on information. Since prices adjust 
quickly, excess returns may only be possible under the case 
when an investor has asymmetric information. However, even 
asymmetric information will not allow an investor to earn 
persistent excess returns since the very act of trading 
reveals information that can be used by other traders to 
benefit. As a result, it may not be profitable for investors 
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to collect costly information. Thus, this theory implies 
technical trading schemes and attempts to obtain additional 
information cannot be used to beat the market consistently. 
Rather, according to this hypothesis, it would be best to hold 
a market portfolio to obtain benefits of diversification 
rather than to attempt to pick winners. 
The third implication of the efficient markets hypothesis 
is that investors will hold the market portfolio and will not 
bet against each other. If information is rapidly 
incorporated in prices, little trade will take place between 
investors. In fact, the only reason trading will occur, once 
the market has reached an equilibrium, will be if investors 
wish to alter the leverage of their portfolios. Otherwise, 
they are removing the systematic risk through diversification. 
However, the actual volume of trade on exchanges appears much 
greater than would be justified for only this purpose. Cutler 
et al. (1990) cite 1988 NYSE statistics that almost 75 percent 
of the shares trade hands each year and about $400 billion of 
foreign currency is traded each day. Therefore, speculation 
appears to play a larger role than efficient markets would 
indicate. 
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3. The contrasting notions of these views 
The efficient markets hypothesis and the technical 
traders' views of the market differ significantly in 
discussing the behavior of investors, the significance of news 
in driving the market, the existence of patterns in stock 
prices, and the ability of investors to gain excess profits 
consistently. 
Under the efficient markets hypothesis, investors are 
assumed to be motivated by maximizing profit. Their only 
strategy for obtaining profits is to gather and analyze 
information relevant to pricing a stock. Competition between 
investors exists only in obtaining information since it is 
news which drives market prices. 
For chartists, however, investors may have profit as only 
one of many goals. Investors are able to obtain profit by 
playing against each other. Therefore, their strategy is to 
develop rules which exploit the predictable behavior of 
investors. Understanding the behavior of investors is the key 
to understanding how the market is driven. To efficient 
markets' proponents, the market is driven by the arrival of 
information so understanding the behavior of others is 
irrelevant. 
According to the chartists, human behavior explains why 
stock prices appear to follow trends and patterns. Efficient 
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market proponents, however, disagree that these stock price 
movements are trends but rather that they are random movements 
due to the random arrival of news. They may refer to the fact 
that even a random walk series may appear to exhibit trends 
even though it is driven by random errors. 
The argiiment that chartists put forth is that because 
stock prices exhibit trends, predictions can be made about 
stock prices and these predictions can be used to earn profits 
greater than may be earned through a buy-and-hold strategy as 
efficient markets proponents would suggest. According to 
efficient market proponents, however, these "patterns" are 
just random movements of prices so no excess profits can be 
gained by using technical rules. 
Thus, while the technical analysts view the market as 
being driven by fads and exhibiting trends and patterns, 
fundamental analysts view the market as being driven by the 
arrival of information which generates random changes in 
price. While technical analysts view the ability of investors 
to earn excess profits as possible given the "correct" form of 
analysis, proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis view 
profits being consistent only with the riskiness of assets 
held and that a buy-and-hold strategy of a diverse portfolio 
is the best means to reduce risk and generate normal profit. 
This study attempts to discern which opinion is more 
realistic. 
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B. Stock Market Studies 
1. Keynes' observations of the markets 
As was mentioned previously, Keynes (193 6) observations 
of the markets were more consistent with technical traders' 
views. He viewed the market participants as heterogeneous and 
the pricing game as "the outcome of a mass psychology of a 
large number of ignorant individuals" with the danger that 
prices are "liable to change violently as the result of a 
sudden fluctuation of opinion due to factors which do not 
really make much difference to the prospective yield since 
there will be no strong roots of conviction to hold it 
steady." 
In response to the argument that informed traders could 
profit at the expense of the ignorant traders by forming an 
opinion about the long-term forecast of the asset yield and 
waiting, he noted that these professionals were concerned with 
what the market will value it at in the short term. He 
likened the professional investment game to a newspaper 
competition in which the competitors have to pick out the six 
prettiest faces from one hundred photographs when the prize is 
awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds 
to the average preferences of the group of competitors. Each 
competitor will pick the faces which he thinks are the most 
likely to be chosen by other competitors, rather than choosing 
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his favorite. But each competitor is faced with the same 
problem. Therefore, the game becomes an attempt to anticipate 
"what average opinion expects the average opinion to be" 
rather than to form one's own educated opinion. 
With markets which are focused in this way rather than 
when each player is attempting to gather pertinent information 
and develop an informed opinion about over-valued and under­
valued assets, Keynes warns this type of strategy contributes 
to instability in the market, speculation, and "crises of 
confidence" whereby times of uncertainty encourage more 
consumption and less new investment. 
2. Early evidence in support of efficient markets 
The efficient markets hypothesis was developed as an 
alternative to Keynes' view of the market. It grew out of the 
assumption that investors act rationally in their own self-
interest with limited information. Unlike technical analysis, 
the efficient markets hypothesis provides an analytic 
foundation to represent investors' behavior. This 
representation is discussed in the next section. 
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a. Analytical representation of the efficient markets 
hypothesis 
A market is said to exhibit informational efficiency if 
the one-period rate of return that an investor expects to 
receive on an investment in an asset will be equal to the 
opportunity cost of using those funds. In much of the early 
empirical literature, the opportunity cost of investing was 
set equal to the risk-free rate of interest, rp. 
Justification for this assumption was made either by assuming 
that investors were risk-neutral or by assiiming that an 
asset's risk was diversified away in large portfolios. 
Therefore, letting denote the total one-period return 
on an asset including capital gains as well as dividend 
payouts, the efficient markets hypothesis asserts that 
=(l+r^) , (1) 
where E is the expectation taken with respect to a given 
information set I available at time period t and includes the 
risk-free rate. 
Assuming no dividend payments, the one-period return on 
the asset is the future price, Pt+i, divided by current price 
( 2 )  
Since is included in the information set. It, we can rewrite 
(1) as 
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E{P,,^\l,) = {l+r^) P„ (3) 
or equivalently, 
(4) 
Fama (197 0) described a hierarchy of nested information 
sets which are used to determine prices. If the information 
set contains all of the available information which could 
possibly be relevant to pricing the asset, including privately 
held information, then strong-form efficiency is said to hold. 
If only publicly-available information is contained in the 
information set, semistrong-form efficiency is said to hold. 
If the information set contains only current and past price 
history of the asset as well as the risk-free rate, weak-form 
efficiency is said to hold. 
Since these information sets are nested, rejection of any 
category implies rejection of all stronger forms. Therefore, 
many of the early tests focused on testing weak-form 
efficiency. 
b. Empirical studies of the random walk hypothesis 
The first tests of weak-form efficiency focused on a very 
specific form of equation (3)--a random walk model. It must 
be emphasized, however, that a random walk model is just a 
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specific example of the Martingale process. It was argued 
that, if only past prices are included in the information set, 
equation (3) can be written as: 
(-Pt+l l-^t'-^t-l' • • 
Under weak-form efficiency, since current price contains all 
the information relevant to pricing next period's asset, the 
null hypothesis is that WQ = 0, =1 + rp, and = 0. 
Previous price information should already be incorporated in 
current price. If, for example, ttj were found to be 
significantly different from zero, the null hypothesis would 
be rejected. 
While initial studies could not reject this random walk 
hypothesis (Fama, 1965), it must be recognized that it is a 
joint test of both weak-form efficiency and the random walk 
model. The random walk hypothesis implies weak-form 
efficiency but the converse is not true. Thus, failure to 
reject the null hypothesis cannot be used to prove the 
efficient markets hypothesis and a rejection of the model 
cannot disprove weak-form efficiency. This weakness was noted 
and new tests constructed. 
c. Studies of return predictability 
Not only does the weak-form of efficient markets imply 
that lagged prices should not play a role in determining next 
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period's price, but also that changes in prices should be 
random and therefore serially uncorrelated. Consider the 
covariance between two adjacent rates of return, 
=E(R,,^[R^-E{R^)]) (6) 
Following Ross (1989), under a constant opportunity cost or 
interest rate which implies that future returns are 
independent of past returns and that future expected returns 
should be constant: 
=^[ (l+rt,i) |i?t] (7) 
=E(l+r,,^) . 
Putting (6) and (7) together, 
cov{R^,^\R^) =E{l+rt,^) E[R^-E{Rt)] =0 ( 8 )  
such that returns are serially uncorrelated. 
The early tests often found that short-term returns 
exhibited positive serial correlation. For example, Fama's 
1965 study found first-order positive autocorrelations in 
daily returns for 23 of 30 Dow Jones Industrial stocks. 
However, questions were raised about the statistical power of 
these tests and evidence suggested that the portion of the 
variance of returns explained by variation in expected returns 
was less than one percent for individual stocks (Fama, 1991). 
Therefore, the hypothesis of market efficiency and constant 
expected returns could not be rejected. 
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3. Return autocorrelation and mean-reversion studies 
More recent studies of the predictability in stock price 
returns have found conflicting evidence. There have been many-
studies which have found positive serial correlation of 
returns at short intervals but negative correlation of returns 
at longer (greater than one year) intervals (Fama and French, 
1988; Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Poterba and Summers, 1988). 
These studies suggest that stock prices exhibit mean-reverting 
behavior. In other words, prices may temporarily deviate from 
fundamental value and then return to fundamental value. 
These mean-reversion studies often use variance-ratio 
tests to determine if prices are efficient. The idea behind 
these tests is that stock price volatilities should be the 
same in the long-run whether prices are mean reverting or 
efficient if arbitrage takes place. Short-run volatilities, 
however, would be greater if prices are mean-reverting. As a 
result, the ratio of long-run volatility to short-run 
volatility should be smaller if prices are mean-reverting. As 
Poterba and Summers (1988) explain, using the variance of 
stock returns as the measure of volatility, the variance of k-
year returns (r^) should be k times the variance of 1-year 
returns (rj) under efficient markets: 
Var (Zj^) =k'Var () (9) 
or. 
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Vax{r^) 
k-Vaz{x^) =1. (10) 
However, if prices are mean reverting and excessively volatile 
in the short-run, this ratio should be less than one to 
reflect the higher relative short-run variance. 
Poterba and Summers (1988) calculated variance ratios for 
investment horizons of 1-month to 8 years for monthly NYSE 
stock returns less U.S. T-bill returns as well as monthly NYSE 
real stock returns measured using the CPI. Their tests 
suggest that returns are positively serially correlated for 
periods less than 1 year and negatively serially correlated at 
horizons longer than 2 years with ratios falling well below 
unity the further the time horizon. Similar results were 
found for most of the 16 other countries they examined. Thus, 
these variance-ratio tests were supportive of mean-reverting 
behavior for both U.S. stock indexes and the majority of 
foreign stock indexes. Cutler et al. (1990) confirmed the 
Poterba and Summers results by finding significant monthly 
autocorrelations in U.S. stock market excess returns over the 
short-term T-bill rate. However, these studies have been 
criticized on many grounds ranging from the question about the 
power of their tests to the question of using a random walk as 
the null hypothesis. In fact, random walk behavior may not be 
consistent only in the case of efficient markets, but it may 
also be consistent with a series of share prices which deviate 
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from fundamentals in a persistent manner (Summers, 1986). 
In related work, Fama and French (1988) used regression 
tests to examine the existence of mean reversion. With mean-
reverting behavior, a regression of stock returns on a 
constant and past returns, the coefficient on past returns 
should be negative. In earlier studies, the time horizon was 
weekly or monthly returns. However, Fama and French used much 
longer time horizons. They regressed multiyear returns on 
past multiyear returns for investment horizons of one to ten 
years. They found that the coefficients on past returns 
became negative for two-year returns, reached even lower 
values for three- to five-year returns, and then approached 
zero as the investment horizon increased to eight years. More 
specifically, they found that approximately 25 to 45 percent 
of the variation in 3 to 5 year stock returns is predictable 
from past returns which they stated was consistent with 
markets in which prices take long, temporary swings away from 
fundamental value. They attributed these temporary components 
to fads. 
It must be noted that criticism of these mean-reversion 
studies exists. Engle and Morris (1991) summarize these 
studies and note that some critics argue the evidence for mean 
reversion is weak, either because the data samples are too 
small or because the evidence depends entirely on the behavior 
of stock prices before World War II. They also note that 
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other critics argue that mean reverting behavior can exist in 
an efficient market when real interest rates vary over time. 
However, the models finding mean-reversion of stock prices 
assumed a constant real interest rate and therefore constant 
real returns under efficient markets. 
Despite these criticisms, the early studies which found 
support for efficient markets were questioned and attention 
was refocused on the possible existence of bubbles, fads, and 
trends. Economists began to search for alternative hypotheses 
to efficient markets. One theory of why stock prices may 
exhibit this mean-reverting behavior has been put forth by 
Cutler et al. (1990). They hypothesize that many traders pay 
attention to recent trends in returns. These "feedback 
traders" believe that if a stock's returns have been high in 
the recent past, they are likely to be high in the future and, 
conversely, if returns have been low in the recent past, they 
are likely to be low in the future. When feedback traders act 
upon these beliefs, they cause price to deviate from 
fundamental value. For example, if a stock has had recent 
high returns, feedback traders will buy that stock and push 
prices higher still. Risk-averse traders may only take 
limited positions if they detect valuation errors in the 
short-run (Summers, 1986). In the long-run, however, 
arbitragers are believed to bring prices back in line with 
f undamen t a1 va1ue. 
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Therefore, mean-reverting prices support the technical 
traders' view that patterns can occur in stock prices and that 
these patterns may be manipulated to earn excess profits. It 
must be noted that several technical trading rules take 
advantage of the feedback trading idea to buy when high and 
sell when low. 
If prices are mean-reverting, there are several 
implications. First, expected returns may vary through time 
rather than being constant as implied by efficient markets. 
For example, if prices suddenly jump above fundamental value 
and then slowly return, greater than average returns will be 
realized at the onset followed by lower than average returns 
as prices return. Second, mean-reversion implies that prices 
are excessively volatile in the short-run. In the case where 
fundamental value and prices rise due to new information, 
prices will have a tendency to rise more than fundamental 
value dictates and then slowly revert to the new, higher 
level. 
These findings of mean-reverting behavior of prices and 
implication of excessive volatility in the markets was 
supported by another branch of studies which focused on price 
volatility. 
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4. Excess volatility of prices 
Pre-dating the mean-reversion studies, some research on 
the stock market provided evidence that stock prices may not 
always reflect fundamental value. A seminal study by Shiller 
in 1981 found that the volatility in stock returns is not 
entirely explained by changes in dividends. Since an 
efficient stock market price can be expressed as the value of 
all discounted future expected dividend payments, then changes 
in expected future dividends would be expected to change 
current price. He hypothesized that if stock market prices 
reflected fundamental value as the efficient markets 
hypothesis indicates, the variance of expected future 
dividends should be much greater than the variance of actual 
stock prices. Intuitively, he described market price as a 
moving average. A change in one expected future dividend 
payment would not change price dramatically. As a proxy for 
expected future dividends, he used actual dividends and found 
that the variance of dividends was much smaller than the 
variance of actual prices. Indeed, his volatility tests show 
that stock price changes over the past century are five to 
thirteen times higher than would be justified by new 
information about future real dividends so he concludes, "the 
failure of the efficient markets model is thus so dramatic 
that it would seem impossible to attribute the failure to such 
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things as data errors, price index problems, or changes in tax 
laws." Later work by Shiller (1984) attributed this excess 
volatility in prices to a mass psychology behavior by 
investors. 
Numerous studies on the excess variability of stock 
prices relative to dividends followed, including those by West 
(1988) and Campbell and Shiller (1988). The drawback of the 
majority of these later studies is that they also use simple 
constant expected return models, the major critique of 
Shiller's 1981 study. As Fama (1991) notes, with much 
evidence that expected stock and bond returns vary with 
expected inflation rates, interest rates, and other term-
structure variables, efficiency tests on models with constant 
expected returns are not informative. Unfortunately, 
volatility tests which attempt to model varying expected 
returns also run into the problem of a joint hypothesis of the 
model specification and market efficiency. A rejection of the 
hypothesis could indicate rejection of the model rather than 
of market efficiency just as occurred in the constant expected 
returns models before. 
Other studies of stock price returns examined the effect 
of information on stock price volatility. In an attempt to 
study market volatility as a result of news, French and Roll 
(1986) compared U.S. stock prices during periods when the 
exchange was closed on Wednesdays and when it was open on 
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Wednesdays. Under efficient markets, it was hypothesized that 
prices should be less volatile when the market is open on 
Wednesdays since any news can be directly incorporated into 
prices. However, they found that the market was less volatile 
when the market was closed Wednesdays. 
According to the efficient markets hypothesis, price 
changes should occur only when there is news of changes in 
fundamentals. While studies which examined price changes 
after news had been received by the markets generally found 
that prices incorporated news quickly, Cutler et al. (1989) 
turned the question around and found contradictory evidence. 
They asked the question how often changes in stock returns 
were the result of news. They found that a substantial 
portion (less than 1/2 in most cases) of changes in stock 
returns were not explained by macroeconomic or political news. 
Indeed, these researchers concluded that there is a 
possibility that many investors do not formulate their own 
estimates of fundamental value but rather that investors look 
at current market prices as the gauges of value which are then 
used to formulate perceptions of fundamental value. 
As before, the implications of excessive volatility of 
prices are that investors may be able to detect patterns in 
prices and gain excess profits from the exploitation of these 
patterns. Unfortunately, there is not conclusive evidence 
that excessive volatility really exists. 
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5. Speculative bubbles studies 
Another branch of stock market studies related to the 
excess volatility literature concerns testing for speculative 
bubbles in stock prices. The idea of a speculative bubble is 
that market participants may rationally cause prices to 
deviate from fundamental value when prices depend positively 
on their own expected rate of change. Under such a condition, 
the arbitrary, self-fulfilling expectation of a price change 
may drive actual price changes (Flood and Garber, 1980) . It 
is believed that eventually, expectations of positive price 
changes are revised such that the bubble bursts and price 
returns to fundamental value. 
Examples of such speculative bubbles are plentiful. They 
include Tulipmania of the 1630s, John Law's Mississippi bubble 
of 1716-1721, the bubble involving the South Sea Company of 
1711, the Florida land boom of the 1920s, the stock market 
boom of the 1920s and subsequent crash in 1929, and most 
recently, the stock market boom of the 1980s and subsequent 
crash in 1987. 
Speculative bubbles, by some accounts, begin with an 
event which is extraneous to the market and generates much 
irrational speculative activity. As Dreman (1977) describes 
some of the bubbles in stock prices, the excessive price rises 
"could not have occurred without -the development of a mania 
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which created its own social reality far removed from past 
standards of value." However, Garber (1990) goes to great 
lengths to describe the events surrounding Tulipmania, the 
Mississippi and South Seas bubbles and attribute rational, 
market-fundamental explanations to each. In these cases, he 
points to events which could rationally describe why 
speculators would perceive an increased probability of large 
returns. For example, in the case of Tulipmania, he pointed 
to the idea that the bulbs whose prices increased were those 
affected by a mosaic virus which produced a new pattern in the 
flower. This bulb could only be reproduced by budding of the 
mother bulb. Therefore, he explains that a few of the most 
beautiful, but rare varieties became cherished and as their 
reputation grew, so did their price. In addition, he points 
to a shift in fashion toward the appreciation of tulips in a 
short time period which generated rising prices for all the 
rare bulbs. 
Although attempts have been successful to attribute some 
of these rises and crashes to fundamentals. White (1990) 
believes that not all the bubbles can be justified as existing 
in efficient markets. He examined the 1929 stock market crash 
and suggests that it may have been fundamentals which 
initiated the boom beginning in the mid-1920s but that 
fundamentals could not sustain it. He notes that changes in 
dividends did not keep pace with stock prices and that 
management in several corporations warned the public that they 
believed that future earnings would not justify the high 
prices. He also notes that the typical explanation that easy 
credit made the boom sustainable may not be a suitable answer 
since interest rates on brokers' loans increased sharply after 
1927 suggesting that it was the rising tide of speculation 
which increased funds demanded and not any independent 
creation of credit. With major changes in industry at the 
time, fundamentals became difficult to assess which, according 
to White, made the environment ripe for a bubble to occur. 
Concerning the crash of 1929, he suggests the most likely 
explanation is that the downturn in the business cycle, made 
more severe by tight credit, prompted a revision in 
expectations. 
In a detailed discussion of the crash of 1987, Arbel and 
Kaff (1989) point to signs that the stock market was 
considered overvalued in 1987 long before the crash occurred. 
Prices and volume were continuously increasing over the period 
1982-87 but P/E ratios in the U.S. were about 23 before the 
crash, the highest since World War II, and prices were also 
running about three times book value. Although they do not 
focus on causes of the initial build of stock prices, they do 
provide some ideas as to why expectations changed in the fall 
of 1987. Climbing interest rates, a fear of inflation, a rise 
in the twin deficits, the value of the dollar declining 
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against most currencies, the collapse of the bond market, 
concerns over corporate performances and national leadership 
all contributed to the 47 6 point gradual decline in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average in the 52 volatile days preceding 
Black Monday and a 508 point plunge on Black Monday. 
The debate over whether these historical events are 
speculative bubbles or not cannot be easily solved by simple 
empirical tests. As with all other tests of market 
efficiency, determining an accurate measurement of fundamental 
value is a major problem. The only way to detect if a bubble 
has occurred is to know that prices have systematically 
deviated from fundamental value. While some economists have 
postulated that the failure of variance bound tests like that 
of Shiller (1981) can be due to speculative bubbles. Flood and 
Hodrick (1986) show in a model which includes bubbles that 
they can derive a similar variance bound condition. 
Therefore, variance bound tests may not be adequate for 
detecting bubbles. 
As Summers (1986) discusses, most tests of market 
efficiency have little power to reject market efficiency. 
Questions about market efficiency remain unanswered. 
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6. Other studies questioning efficient markets 
There are other anomalies in the stock market which 
suggest that prices do not reflect fundamental value. One 
example is the January effect. The January effect refers to 
the fact that small stocks have outperformed stock price 
indexes by a substantial amount each January over the past 50 
years or so. Ritter (1988) attributed this effect to the fact 
that individual investors tend to sell these stocks in 
December to realize capital losses for tax purposes, but then 
buy back the stocks in January. Arbitrage does not eliminate 
the price effects of this temporary trading as the efficient 
markets hypothesis suggests should occur. 
Although it is logical to believe that these predictable 
patterns will be located by investors and arbitraged away such 
that prices reflect fundamental value, Summers (1986) points 
out that the same considerations which make deviations from 
fundamental value difficult to isolate statistically for 
econometricians make it unlikely that they will be arbitraged 
away or eliminated by speculative trading. 
Therefore, with findings that stock prices do not always 
reflect fundamental value and also that autocorrelation exists 
in stock returns, some have suggested that there is reason to 
believe that returns can, to some extent, be predicted. If 
this is true, then it may be possible for technical analysts 
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to detect predictable patterns in prices to earn excess 
returns. 
This is the conclusion reached in a recent paper by Brock 
et al. (1992). The paper discusses the use of a few technical 
trading rules to predict future price changes. Using 
bootstrapping techniques, they generate returns from an 
artificial Dow series and apply the trading rules to these 
series. These artificial series are simulated from four 
typical stock price models: a random walk with drift, an 
AR(1), a GARCH-M, and an EGARCH. Comparisons are then made 
between returns in these simulated series and the actual Dow 
Jones series. Their findings lead them to conclude that 
technical analysis helps to predict stock price changes since 
the profits under the technical trading rules are not 
consistent with returns generated by any of the four types of 
simulated series. However, they admit that they have not 
accounted for transaction costs. 
7. Studies about investor behavior 
Any answer to the question about whether changes in stock 
prices can be predicted for gain must also address the actual 
behavior of players in the stock market, The behavior of 
traders is key to understanding why it may not be the case 
that excess profits may be arbitraged away. 
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a. Market players and their investment strategies 
The first question may ask who are the major players in 
the stock market and how do they behave? These major players 
are usually professionals, often called "smart money." They 
can manage pension plans, profit reinvestment plans, and work 
at large institutional brokerages. It is often assumed that 
these are the rational players who are well-versed in all 
aspects of business to determine whether stocks are over- or 
under-valued. However, Dreman (1977) provides many instances 
where these players, perhaps due to pressures from superiors 
to gain profit in the short-run, have performed more poorly 
using their strategies than had they held a market portfolio. 
For example, he says that corporate pension and profit-sharing 
plans would have been worth $13 billion more during the period 
1966-1975 had they done as well as the S&P 500. He states 
that this finding and others contradict the basic premise of 
efficient markets that the operations of these professionals 
keep prices at fundamental value. 
Then one may ask what types of trading strategies are 
used by major traders in the market. It is true some experts 
do incorporate technical analysis in the formation of at least 
short-run expectations of returns. A survey of chief foreign 
exchange dealers in the London market was conducted by Allen 
and Taylor (1990). They found that at short forecasting 
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horizons (interday to one week), approximately 90% of 
respondents used some chartist input in forming expectations 
of exchange rates. At longer forecast horizons (one to three 
months or six months to one year), the weight given to 
fundamentals increased and with forecast horizons of one year 
or longer, 30% of respondents relied on pure fundamentals 
while 85% judged fundamentals to be more important than 
charts. Therefore, fundamental analysis may not be of the 
utmost importance in at least short-term forecasts in the 
currency markets. Technical analysis is also used in other 
markets. In a book by Jack Schwager titled The New Market 
Wizards (1992), he interviews several professional traders who 
have records of beating the markets consistently. One trader, 
Linda Bradford Raschke explains: 
One of my favorite patterns is the tendency for the 
markets to move from relative lows to relative highs and 
vice versa every two to four days. This pattern is a 
function of human behavior. It takes several days of a 
market rallying before it looks really good. That's when 
everyone wants to buy it, and that's the time when the 
professionals, like myself, are selling. Conversely, 
when the market has been down for a few days, and 
everyone is bearish, that's the time I like to be buying, 
(p. 300) 
In other words, she has been able to determine short-term 
patterns in asset prices and has capitalized on these 
movements using no fundamental analysis. 
Rather than citing certain professional traders who claim 
to use technical analysis, it may be more instructive to ask 
if there is evidence in the markets that many traders do use a 
buy-and-hold strategy as efficient markets would indicate. If 
most investors, or at least the major investors, were to use a 
buy-and-hold strategy, one may not expect to see a large 
volume of trading in the markets. However, there is evidence 
to the contrary. Cutler et al. (1990) cite 1988 NYSE 
statistics that almost 75 percent of the shares trade hands 
each year. In the foreign exchange market, about $400 billion 
of foreign currency is traded each day. These figures 
indicate that there is much speculation in asset markets. 
b. Block buying and selling 
With much speculation occurring in asset markets, 
investors must be playing against each other rather than 
against states of nature. For a trade to occur, each investor 
must have different beliefs about the information he 
possesses. But, as Black (1986) notes, differences in beliefs 
must derive ultimately from differences in information. In 
reality, investors try to obtain much, costly information 
about the assets which they believe will give them an "upper 
hand" in the markets. They consult brokers, buy books, read 
newspapers and newsletters written by financial advisors. 
They consult with financial gurus who claim to have had 
success beating the market. If many investors listen to these 
few voices, block buying and selling can occur. 
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This tendency for investors to listen to others when 
deciding their investment strategy has been called a mass 
psychology of the market. Some economists other than Keynes 
believe that mass psychology plays a large role in stock price 
changes. Shiller (1984) documents some studies of investor 
behavior leading him to believe that mass psychology is 
prevalent in the stock market. Indeed, Shleifer and Summers 
(1990) conclude from their survey of the evidence that news 
alone does not move stock prices; uninformed changes in demand 
change them as well. 
Block buying and selling behavior was modeled by Denton 
(1985) to discuss the effect of professional advice on a 
speculative market. One case he mentions occurred when people 
listened to a single investment professional, Joseph 
Granville, which spurred a 23-point plunge in the Dow Jones 
average on January 7, 1981. Granville's advice was to sell 
everything delivered by Telex and telephone worldwide on the 
preceding Tuesday. What followed the next day in New York was 
a selling fury which brought the Dow below 1,000 in the 
biggest single day's trading of the exchange's first 188 
years. In this case, the advice given by Granville became a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. Ex-post it was rational to follow 
his advice even if it were not based on fundamental analysis. 
Denton (1985) proposes a model of markets dominated by 
random fluctuations where all participants are equally 
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rational and well-informed. Some agents are advisors or "wise 
owls" and others are investors. When investors are allowed to 
choose their advisors based on an observed track record which 
has arisen solely because of luck (but investors do not know 
skill plays no role), and if they are allowed to change 
advisors toward those with better track records, then the 
number of "wise owls" from whom investors take advice 
decreases over time. The result is block buying and selling 
as time progresses, making the market more unstable. 
Other disciplines have also documented group behavior 
under uncertainty. Social psychologists have shown 
experimentally that the greater the uncertainty, and the fewer 
the objective criteria, the more we measure reality against 
the opinions of others.^ As Dreman (1977) documents, a 
Professor of Psychology at Yale, Irving Janis, has discussed 
the phenomenon called Groupthink and stated that the most 
frequent behavior of individuals in groups shows "instances of 
mindless conformity and collective misjudgment of serious 
risks which are collectively laughed off in a clubby 
atmosphere of relaxed conviviality." Therefore, fads or group 
actions may influence traders if those actions are unfounded 
in sound judgment. 
Dreman (1977) suggests that not only naive traders, but 
^See for example Muzafer Sherif, "An Experimental 
Approach to the Study of Attitudes," Sociometry, vol. 1 
(1937), pp. 90-98. 
42 
also professional traders are subject to these Groupthink 
pressures. He discusses many examples of. institutional 
investors being subject to social pressures and says that 
Groupthink may account for a significant portion of all 
professional investment errors and may also explain why 
professionals have not outperformed the markets. 
c. Noise trading 
An alternate theory to the efficient markets hypothesis 
has been put forth by economists to incorporate some of the 
evidence of the speculation in markets, the mean-reversion of 
prices, autocorrelated returns, and speculative bubbles. This 
more recent theory has been developed based on the views of 
Keynes and discusses the existence of uninformed or noise 
traders in financial markets. 
A single definition of noise is difficult to find. The 
term noise can be used in several contexts. In general, noise 
refers to the confusion added to prices by the accumulation of 
a large number of small events or by the aggregation of small 
actions of a large nxamber of people. Black (1986) defines 
noise in financial markets as contrasting with information. 
Therefore, noise traders are uninformed traders--those that 
trade on noise as if it were information. 
Trading on noise is not to be confused with 
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irrationality. Noise arises because traders are uncertain 
about future outcomes and have incomplete information sets. 
Uncertainty arises from several sources: uncertainty about 
fundamental value, uncertainty about future risk and return, 
and uncertainty about how much information is reflected in 
current prices. Given uncertainty and limited information, 
these traders make the best decisions they are able to. When 
trading is based on errors of information, noise is added to 
prices. Thus, the market signal inherent in price is 
distorted by uncertainty and that distortion is noise. 
As Keynes postulated, noise traders' demand for assets is 
affected by beliefs or sentiments that are not fully 
consistent with long-run economic fundamentals. Instead of 
using models that reflect fundamentals, they use "models" that 
seem to be more successful in predicting the short-run 
direction of asset prices. Some noise traders are chartists. 
Others are non-chartist traders who try to profit by 
predicting the market's reaction to any news or rumors without 
necessarily using any particular kind of model. One type of 
noise trader mentioned previously was a "feedback trader" 
whose trading actions accentuated trends (Cutler et al., 
1990) . 
In this scenario, changes in price may be a response to 
pseudo-signals that investors believe convey information about 
future returns but that would not. convey such information in a 
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fully rational model (Black, 1986). Such pseudo-signals can 
include the advice of brokers. 
Many models of noise trading assume that the noise 
traders are in the majority. Indeed, Keynes (1936) noted that 
those who attempt to make a serious estimate of the 
fundamental values "are often so much in the minority that 
their behavior does not govern the market." A minority of 
traders, called arbitrageurs or smart money, is assiimed to 
know or have a good idea about the fundamental values of 
assets. As Shleifer and Summers (1990) explain, when noise 
traders act as a group, perhaps listening to the advice of a 
Wall Street guru, their trading actions may not offset each 
other and could cause price to deviate from fundamental value. 
To describe the noise trading theory more succinctly, its 
two basic assumptions should be noted. From these assumptions 
arises an explanation why stock prices can exhibit correlated 
returns and mean reversion. The first assumption is that 
noise trading activities are not random and do not necessarily 
cancel one another out. If noise trading activities are 
correlated, they can lead to aggregate shifts in demand for 
assets. Second, the noise trading hypothesis assumes that 
arbitrage is limited because arbitrageurs are risk-averse and 
are subject to noise trader or price resale risk. Noise 
trader risk occurs when arbitrageurs are uncertain if prices 
will deviate further away from fundamental value in the 
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presence of noise traders. If arbitrageurs have a finite time 
horizon during which they must liquidate a position, then they 
run the risk that assets may be mispriced in the future. 
Thus, arbitrage cannot fully counter unjustified movements in 
asset prices prompted by noise trading. 
C. Summary of the Literature 
The literature and empirical studies of asset markets 
have come full circle. Keynes' observations of the markets as 
being driven by uninformed traders who cause excessive 
volatility in prices was replaced by the efficient markets 
hypothesis. Empirical studies of the markets brought into 
question the implications of efficient markets. Correlated 
returns, efxcessive volatility of prices, and mean reversion 
were found in some studies. An alternative hypothesis of 
noise traders has been developed to try to explain these 
anomalies but tests of this hypothesis based on complicated 
models are still underway. 
Therefore, the debate rages on. Whether fundamental 
analysts' views of the markets are correct or if technical 
traders' views of the markets are correct remains unanswered. 
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III. METHODS 
A. Description of the Experiment 
As was mentioned in the introduction, this study attempts 
to answer two questions. First, is it possible to find 
predictable patterns in stock prices as technical traders 
surmise or are these patterns spurious as efficient markets 
advocates would state? The null hypothesis will be that these 
patterns occur just as frequently in stock market data as they 
do in random series generated to mimic several stock price 
series. To test this hypothesis, we conduct a Monte Carlo 
experiment to generate a distribution for the number of times 
a pattern can be found in 10,000 random series. Univariate 
Box-Jenkins analyses are performed on three individual stock 
price series and the Dow Jones Industrial Average to obtain an 
appropriate model for each series. Models are estimated then 
bootstrapping techniques are used to randomly generate errors 
for the models and therefore to generate series which mimic 
the actual price series. These 10,000 series are each passed 
through a filter designed to detect the relevant pattern. The 
experiment is repeated for three different patterns across 
each of four price series. 
The second question this study attempts to answer is if 
profit can be made consistently by following the technical 
traders' rules for pattern trading, ignoring transaction 
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costs. To answer this question, the study runs each data 
series through a filter designed to detect one pattern and 
determine the profit from following the recommended buying or 
selling strategy given an investment of $1 million in funds 
each trade. 
B. Description of the Data Series Used 
Daily closing prices and volume data were collected for 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, Aluminum Company of America, 
General Motors, and Procter and Gamble. The Dow Jones 
Industrial Average data run from 1/4/60 through 9/30/94 
(Pierce, 1991; Standard and Poor's Corp, various dates). Data 
from the other companies extends from 1/2/62 when daily price 
data became readily available to 9/30/94 (Standard and Poor's 
Corp, various dates). Stock prices were adjusted to account 
for stock splits. 
The individual company stock prices were chosen because 
they were all represented in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
during the entire time period and were chosen to be in the 
most non-related businesses of all eighteen Dow Jones 
Industrial Average candidates. Aluminum Company of America 
(Alcoa) manufactures primary and fabricated aluminum, alumina 
and alumina chemicals. General Motors (GM) assembles 
automobiles, trucks, tractors, and military motor vehicles; it 
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manufactures parts and accessories, and acts as a finance 
company. Procter and Gamble (PG) manufactures many household 
items including soaps, detergents, cleaners, personal hygiene 
products, pharmaceuticals, paper products, shortenings, and 
cosmetics. Although it may be argued that Alcoa and GM have 
related businesses since Alcoa is the potential supplier of 
primary products to GM, other candidates which were primary 
goods manufacturers such as Bethlehem Steel or Exxon were not 
better choices. 
While technical traders usually use price information 
including highs, lows, and closing prices as well as volume 
when detecting patterns and trading signals, this study chose 
to ignore the highs and lows for the following reasons: 1) 
closing price is a data point typically chosen as 
representative of trading prices achieved during a single day, 
and 2) Box-Jenkins time-series analysis and subsequent 
estimation procedures used to generate random series focus on 
a single data point for each time period. 
C. Univariate Analysis to Generate Random Series 
Over the years, many different models of stock prices 
have been proposed. Many of these models include explanatory 
variables such as dividends or earnings in an attempt to 
determine a measure of fundamental value of a stock. This 
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study, however, was concerned with generating series which 
mimic the movement of actual stock prices over time rather 
than constructing a measure of fundamental value. 
Box and Jenkins (1976) have proposed a class of ARIMA 
models which they suggest are suited for modeling time-series 
data and generating forecasts. Since stock prices, like many 
economic series, may be considered to be the outcome or 
realization of a stochastic process and since the ARIMA models 
are constructed to represent this stochastic process, the 
ARIMA models are a candidate as at least a starting point to 
identify the stock price series. 
Graphs of the price series (Figure 3.1) reveal that they 
appear to exhibit trends (except GM), perhaps some seasonal 
behavior, and a strong irregular component. The ARIMA models 
are particularly suited to incorporate this behavior. 
There are limitations, however, to the Box-Jenkins 
models. One such limitation is that their methods must be 
used to model stationary data. However, it is obvious from 
the graphs that these price data do not have constant means 
and autocovariances across time as stationarity requires. 
Although structural changes can make a series appear to 
be non-stationary, there was no reason to assume that any 
events occurred in each stock price series to permanently 
change the series. Events like the crash of 1987 and the oil 
price hikes of 1973 and 1979 were assumed to cause temporary 
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Figure 3.1. Graphs of the stock price 
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aberrations in stock prices so no formal tests for structural 
change were performed. 
IVpically, Box-Jenkins identification procedures dictate 
differencing a series to render it stationary. First 
differencing, however, imposes a unit root on the model. 
Although correlograms of first differences of each series 
appear to be stationary, there are formal tests to see if 
first differencing is appropriate. These tests were devised 
by Dickey and Fuller (197 9, 1981) and Phillips and Perron 
(1988) . 
1. Unit root tests 
Since the four price series examined appear from graphs 
and correlograms to be non-stationary, there must be a test 
performed to determine if first differencing is appropriate to 
render the series stationary. 
To test for a single unit root, augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(1981) and Phillips-Perron (1988) tests were performed. 
Estimation requires an hypothesized model with autoregressive 
terms. Even if the true model is a mixed process, it can be 
approximated by a finite-order autoregressive process (Said 
and Dickey, 1984). Therefore, lag length tests were performed 
on each series. These tests involved regressing price returns 
(the first difference of prices) on lagged values and reducing 
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the model step by step. The initial model included twenty 
autoregressive terms which were systematically excluded using 
F-tests.^ After the appropriate mix of autoregressive terms 
was determined, a final model to be tested for each series was 
formed by including both a constant and trend term. Although 
there was no indication of autocorrelated errors in the final 
models, the Phillips-Perron test was also used since it allows 
the errors to be weakly dependent and heterogeneously 
distributed while the Dickey-Fuller test places more stringent 
requirements on the error terms. 
The method of testing for a unit root actually tests for 
a unit root under different models, starting with the largest 
and then pairing down each model. Results of the tests are 
presented in Tables 3.1 through 3.4. With the constant and 
trend term included in each model, unit roots could not be 
rejected across all series at the 5 percent level except 
Alcoa. At the 2.5 percent level, however, the unit root could 
not be rejected for the Alcoa series. In asset prices, there 
is no reason to believe the trend component should be 
important as the next step confirmed. In the presence of a 
unit root, the trend term was found to be insignificant across 
all series and so was eliminated from the next model tested. 
^Twenty lags were chosen because, according to Said and 
Dickey (1984), an unknown ARIMA(p,l,q) process can be 
approximated by an ARIMA(n,l,0) process of order T^''^ where T 
in this study is at most 8745. 
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Table 3.1. Unit root tests for Dow Jones Industrials. 
Model Estimates Test Conclusion 
Ayt=ao+ait+a2yt-i OCn 
= 0 
.0034 (1 .42) D.F . -.-1 .41 Fail to u 
= 0 
.0000 (1 .88) P.P . : -1 .45 reject 
+a2Ayt.i+a4^yt-2 0L2 .0005( -1 .44) * : -3 .41 unit 
+a5Ayt.i+a^^yt-5 a. = 0 .0577 (5 .40) root 
= -
.0302 ( -2 .82) 
tts =: — .0202 ( -1 .89) 
OCfi = 0 .0185 (1 .73) 
Ayt=ao+ait OCn 
^ _ 
.0000 ( -0 .13) Elimin­
tti = 0 .0000 (1 .26) ate 
«2 = 0 .0574 (5 .37) trend 
+a4Ayt-4+a5Ayt-5 <*3 — — .0305( -2 .86) 
"4 = -.0206( -1 .92) 
= 0 
.0182 (1 .70) 
Ayt=ao+aiyt OCo 
_ 
.0003( -0 .20) D.F : 0 .40 Fail to 
«1 = 0 .0001 (0 .35) P.P : 0 .37 rej ect 
+a2^yt-i-*-'^3^yt-2 = 0 
.0575 (5 .38) * . -2 .86 unit 
+«4Ayt-4+a5Ayt-5 
"3 = -.0304 ( -2 .85) root 
(*4 = — .0205 ( -1 .91) 
"5 = 0 .0183 (1 .71) 
Ayt=ao OCo 
= 0 
.0002 (1 .93) Elimin­
«i = 0 .0576 (5 .39) ate 
+aiAyt_i+a2Ayt.2 (*2 = _ .0304( -2 .84) con­
+a3Ayt-4+a4Ayt-5 = -.0204( -1 .90) stant 
"4 = 0 .0184 (1 .72) 
Ayt=aiyt ai 
= 0 
.0000 (1 .95) D.F : 1 .95 Fail to 
a. = 0 .0576 (5 .38) * : -1 . 95 rej ect 
+a2Ayt-i+a3Ayt.2 — -
.0304( -2 .84) unit 
+a4Ayt_4+a5Ayt_5 0(4 = — .0204 ( -1 .91) root 
tts = 0 .0184 (1 .72) 
Avt is the first difference of the log of stock price at 
t ime t. 
(.) indicates t-value. 
D.F. indicates Dickey-Fuller statistic. 
P.P. indicates Phillips-Perron statistic. 
* represents critical value at the 5% level for over 500 
observations. 
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Table 3.2. Unit root tests for Aluminum Company of America. 
Model Estimates Test Conclusion 
Ay(.=ao+ait+a2yt_i 
+a3Ayt-i+a4Ayt-9 
Wo = 0.0108 (3.37) 
ai = 0.0000 (3.19) 
ttj = -.0028(-3.41) 
a3 = 0.0585 (5.32) 
a4 = -.0343(-3.12) 
D.F.:-3.56 
P.P.:-3.49 
*: -3.41 
Reject 
unit 
root 
for 
this 
improb­
able 
model. 
Ayt=ao+ait 
+a2Ayt-i+a3Ayt-9 
OLo = -.0000 (-0.09) 
ai = 0.0000 (0.59) 
a2 = 0.0571 (5.19) 
tta = -.0357(-3.24) 
Elimin­
ate 
trend 
Ayt=ao+aiyt 
+a2Ayt-i+a3Ayt-9 
ao = 0.0028 (1.41) 
ai = -.0006(-1.33) 
OL2 = 0.0575 (5.23) 
= -.0352(-3.20) 
D.F.:-1.35 
P.P.:-1.32 
*: -2.86 
Fail to 
rej ect 
unit 
root 
Ayt=ao 
+aiAyt-i+a2Ayt-9 
ao = 0.0002 (0.84) 
ai = 0.0571 (5.19) 
a2 = -.0356(-3.24) 
Elimin­
ate 
con­
stant 
Ayt=aiyt 
+a2Ayt-i+a3Ayt-9 
ai = 0.0000 (0.71) 
a2 = 0.0571 (5.19) 
a3 = -.0356(-3.24) 
D.F.; 0.71 
*: -1.95 
Fail to 
reject 
unit 
root 
Ay,- is the first difference of the log of stock price at 
t ime t. 
(.) indicates t-value. 
D.F. indicates Dickey-Fuller statistic. 
P.P. indicates Phillips-Perron statistic. 
* represents critical value at the 5% level for over 500 
observations. 
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Table 3.3. Unit root tests for General Motors. 
Model Estimates Test Conclusion 
Ayt=ao+ait+a2yt-i a,o 0 .0079 (2 .63) D.F . :-2 .73 Fail to 
«i — 0 .0000 (0 .22) P.P . :-2 .81 reject 
+«3^yt-2+«4^yt-3 •— 
-
.0019 ( -2 .63) * . -3 .41 unit 
+a5^yt-4 a, ~ -.0397 ( -3 .61) root 
= 
-.0233 ( -2 .12) 
Us = — .0268 ( -2 .43) 
Ayt=ao+ait 0 .0000 (0 .16) Elimin­
«! = 0 .0000 (0 .06) ate 
+a2^yt-2+a3^yt-3 a,-, - — .0407 ( -3 .70) trend 
+a4^yt-4 — -.0242 ( -2 .20) 
CX4 .0276( -2 .51) 
Ayt=ao+aiyt fXo 0 .0079 
(2 .64) D.F . :-2 .72 Fail to 
— 
.0019 ( -2 .62) P.P . :-2 .79 rej ect 
+a2^yt-2+a3^yt-3 -
-
.0397( -3 .61) * : -2 .86 unit 
+a4^yt-4 a. — -.0233 ( -2 .12) root 
a. .0268 ( -2 .43) 
OCn 0 .0001 (0 .42) Elimin­
Ayt=ao+aiAyt_2 tti = -.0407( -3 .70) ate 
+a2Ayt.3+a3Ayt_4 a2 
= 
-.0242 { -2 .20) con­
ttj .0276( -2 .51) stant 
oti _ 0 .0000 (0 .27) D.F . : 0 .27 Fail to 
Ayt=aiyt+a2^yt-2 = -.0407( -3 .70) • • -1 .95 reject 
+a3Ayt_3+a4Ayt_4 
= 
-. 0242 ( -2 .20) unit 
(*4 .0276 ( -2 .51) root 
Avt is the first difference of the log of stock price at 
time t. 
(.) indicates t-value. 
D.F. indicates Dickey-Fuller statistic. 
P.P. indicates Phillips-Perron statistic. 
* represents critical value at the 5% level for over 500 
observations. 
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Table 3.4. Unit root tests for Procter and Gamble. 
Model Estimates Test Conclusion 
Ayt=ao+ait+a2yt-i 
+a3^yt-l+<*4-^^-2 
+a5^yt-4 
t t o  =  0 . 0 0 4 7  ( 2 . 0 8 )  
a i  =  0 . 0 0 0 0  ( 2 . 3 9 )  
a j  =  - . 0 0 1 2  ( - 2 . 1 0 )  
t t j  =  0 . 0 2 7 0  ( 2 . 4 5 )  
a 4  =  - . 0 3 2 8 ( - 2 . 9 8 )  
a s  =  - . 0 4 3 3  ( - 3 . 9 3 )  
D.F.: - 2 . 2 0  
P . P . : - 2  . 2 9  
* :  - 3 . 4 1  
Fail to 
reject 
unit 
root 
Ayt=ao+ait 
+a2^yt-i+«3^yt-2 
+a4^yt-4 
a o  =  0 . 0 0 0 0  ( 0 . 0 1 )  
a i  =  0 . 0 0 0 0  ( 1 . 2 1 )  
a 2  =  0 . 0 2 6 4  ( 2 . 4 0 )  
t t j  =  - . 0 3 3 4 ( - 3 . 0 4 )  
a 4  =  - . 0 4 3 8 ( - 3 . 9 8 )  
Elimin­
ate 
trend 
Ayt=ao+aiyt 
+a2^yt-i+a3^yt-2 
+a4^yt-4 
a o  =  - . 0 0 0 1  ( - 0 . 0 7 )  
t t i  =  0 . 0 0 0 1  ( 0 . 3 6 )  
a 2  =  0 . 0 2 6 5  ( 2 . 4 0 )  
a 3  =  - . 0 3 3 3 ( - 3 . 0 3 )  
a 4  =  - . 0 4 3 7 ( - 3 . 9 7 )  
D.F.: 0 . 3 3  
P . P . :  0 . 3 2  
* :  - 2 . 8 6  
Fail to 
reject 
unit 
root 
Ayt=ao 
+ai'^yt-i+«2^yt-2 
a o  =  0 . 0 0 0 3  ( 2 . 1 1 )  
a i  =  0 . 0 2 6 6  ( 2 . 4 1 )  
a 2  =  - . 0 3 3 3  ( - 3 . 0 2 )  
a 3  =  - . 0 4 3 7 ( - 3 . 9 7 )  
Reject 
model 
which 
does 
not 
include 
con­
stant 1 
Avt is the first difference of the log of stock price at 
time t. 
(.) indicates t-value. 
D.F. indicates Dickey-Fuller statistic. 
P.P. indicates Phillips-Perron statistic. 
* represents critical value at the 5% level for over 500 
observations. 
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The second model which included a constant term was rejected 
in the presence of a unit root for all series except Procter 
and Gamble. For the other three series, the constant term was 
found to be insignificant in the presence of a unit root at 
the 5% level and so was eliminated from the model. Also at 
the 5% level, the unit root could not be rejected across the 
remaining series. 
Therefore, unit roots could not be rejected for any of 
the series. First differencing of the log of the price series 
may be considered as appropriate to render the series 
stationary and to perform the Box-Jenkins identification. 
Correlograms presented in the next section also suggest that 
first differencing produces stationary series. 
2. Box-Jenkins model identification 
Box-Jenkins procedures to identify ARIMA models using 
correlograms was followed. Logarithims of the price series 
were taken before first differencing. The resulting 
correlograms are presented in Figure 3.2. They appear to 
represent stationary series since the sample autocorrelation 
function (acf) and partial autocorrelation function (pacf) 
converge rapidly to zero. 
The Box-Jenkins identification procedure, however, is 
very subjective. Upon examining correlograms, researchers may 
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Figure 3.2. Correlograms of the first difference of the log price series. 
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conclude that a correlogram represents different models. 
Therefore, other objective tests must be used to focus on the 
most appropriate model. Often, the Akaile Information 
Criterion (AIC) and the Schwartz Bayesian Criteria (SBC) 
statistics are used for this purpose (Enders, 1995): 
AIC = T In (residual sum of squares) + 2n 
SBC = T In (residual sum of squares) + n ln(T) 
where T = niimber of observations 
n = number of parameters estimated. 
The smaller these statistics, the better the fit of the model. 
By construction, the SBC will select the most parsimonious 
model. 
The Dow Jones Industrial Average correlogram revealed a 
small-order autoregressive or moving-average component. 
Models with a constant and either one or two moving-average 
terms were compared. The SBC was lower on the more 
parsimonious MA(1) model. The AIC and SBC were comparable on 
an AR(2) model but the MA(1) model was the most parsimonious 
and so was the favored model. Under the MA(1) model, while 
the residuals themselves appear as white noise, the residuals 
squared do not. Therefore, the residuals squared were 
included in the estimation procedure as will be discussed in 
the next section. 
The correlogram for Alcoa reveals a small-order 
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autoregressive or moving-average. Models with moving-average 
terms of order one and which included and excluded a constant 
term were compared. The constant term was found to be 
insignificant. This model was compared to an AR(1) and the 
AIC and SBC were comparable. The AIC and SBC for an ARMA(1,1) 
were worse so it was eliminated from consideration. Since 
other stock prices in this study seem to have the moving-
average component, the MA(1) was chosen. Again, the residuals 
squared were not white noise so they will be included in an 
estimation procedure. 
General Motor's correlogram reveals some small spikes at 
lags 2, 3, and 4. A model with moving-average lags at 2, 3, 
and 4 was compared to an autoregressive model with the same 
lags. The AIC and SBC were comparable. Later estimation 
procedures revealed that a smaller-order model with moving-
average term at lag 2 was the best model since models with 
more lags would not converge. A model including the residuals 
squared was also estimated since they were not white noise. 
The correlogram for Procter and Gamble also revealed a 
small-order autoregressive or moving-average component. Two 
of the more parsimonious models, a MA(2) and and AR(2) were 
found to have similar AIC and SBC statistics. Again, the 
residuals squared in both models were not white noise and 
later estimation procedures revealed that including a second 
lag meant the models would not converge. 
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As was noted before, this Box-Jenkins analysis was used 
to get a preliminary idea of the model. As was evident across 
the series, ARCH processes were present and had to be included 
in the estimation procedure. 
3. Model estimation 
With ARCH processes present across the preliminary models 
chosen, regressions were run on the squared residuals to 
determine the appropriate lag length under each of the 
preliminary models. Since asset prices theoretically include 
ARCH or ARCH-M processes (Engle, 1982; Engle, Lillen, and 
Robbins, 1987), both types of models were estimated in each 
case, and the best fitting model was chosen. 
For the Dow Jones Industrial Average, under a MA(1) model 
with constant term, a regression including ten lags (a two-
week time period) of residuals squared was run. F-tests were 
conducted to determine if lags could be excluded. Although 
the F-value of eliminating lags 6 through 10 was 2.93, when 
lags 9 through 10 were eliminated, the F-value dropped to 2.28 
(significant at 10.1% level). Keeping in mind the idea of 
parsimony, an ARCH(l) process was chosen as the best candidate 
for estimation. Using non-linear maximum likelihood, four 
possible models were estimated (Appendix A). The model which 
achieved the highest maximum function value and significant 
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coefficients was the ARCH-M model and so was chosen as the 
model to generate random series. 
For Alcoa, the MA(1) model with no constant term had been 
chosen as a candidate. Lag length tests performed on the 
residuals squared series indicated the presence of an ARCH(5) 
process. Therefore, the candidate for estimation was a MA(1) 
with ARCH(5) residuals. A problem arose, however, in the 
estimation procedure since models which included so many lags 
of the ARCH process would not converge in 100 iterations, 
despite attempts to generate better initial values. The acf 
value of the first lag in the residuals squared was 0.3 9 but 
dropped to 0.02 and under for the subsequent lags. Therefore, 
the first lag was the most significant and chosen to be 
included in model estimation. Three separate models were 
estimated (Appendix A). The model which included all 
significant variables was the MA(1) without a constant and 
ARCH(l) errors. 
For General Motors, the moving-average model with lags 2, 
3, and 4 and no constant term was the initial candidate. Lag 
length tests for the residuals squared series indicated the 
presence of an ARCH(5) process. The candidate for estimation 
was therefore an MA{2,3,4} with ARCH(5) errors. Estimation of 
this model again posed a problem since, despite many attempts 
to determine the best initial values, the model would not 
converge in 100 iterations. In some cases the ARCH process 
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was reduced to one lag since it was the most significant of 
the five terms, and in other cases the moving-average 
component was reduced to include only the MA{2} term since it, 
too, was the most significant of the three moving-average lags 
and since there was no theoretical reason to believe lags 3 or 
4 would affect stock returns. Estimation results of the 
convergent models are presented in Appendix A. Of the seven 
models tested, only the MA{2} with ARCH(5) errors contained 
coefficients which were all significant and had the highest 
likelihood value so this was the model chosen to generate 
future random series. 
For Procter and Gamble, the MA(2) model with a constant 
was chosen as the initial candidate for estimation. Lag 
length tests indicated that the residuals followed an ARCH(3) 
process. Convergence of models with ARCH(3) processes again 
was not achieved despite attempts to alter starting values. 
Since the first lag of the ARCH process had the most 
significant coefficent, models with ARCH(l) processes were 
estimated. Of the five models estimated (Appendix A), the one 
with significant coefficients and the highest likelihood value 
was the ARCH-M model so this was the model chosen to generate 
future random series. 
Therefore, a variety of univariate models were found for 
these four stock price series. All of them, however, 
exhibited ARCH or ARCH-M errors as may be expected for asset 
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prices. Before discussing the generation of random series 
using these models and the Monte Carlo method, the filtering 
techniques used to detect technical trading patters will be 
clarified in the next two sections. 
D. Description of the Technical Trading Patterns 
The three technical trading patterns in this study were 
chosen to be representative of different classes of patterns. 
Perhaps the best known of these, the Head and Shoulders Top, 
is seen in stock price series which are reversing their trend 
from upward to downward, according to technical analysts. The 
Symmetrical Triangle may represent either a reversal or 
consolidation pattern where prices do not change direction but 
continue the same trend. The Rectangle, like the Symmetrical 
Triangle, can represent either a reversal or consolidation 
pattern. These patterns have been named according to their 
shape. A description of the shapes and technical trading 
explanations for the existence of each pattern are discussed 
below. Much of this discussion is paraphrased from Edwards 
and Magee (1992) who provide the most detailed description of 
all patterns. 
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1. Head and Shoulders Top 
The Head and Shoulders Top received its name because it 
consists of three humps or local maxima where the middle 
maximum (the "head") is higher than the other two (the 
"shoulders"). Prices must declines on either side of the 
"head" to a point which is lower than each shoulder, but there 
is no requirement that one shoulder be higher or lower than 
the other. Technical analysts also draw in a "neckline" on 
their charts as the pattern progresses. This "neckline" is a 
line which connects the two local minima on either side of the 
head and is used to help determine when to buy or sell. This 
idea will be discussed in the next section. 
Volume on the Head and Shoulders Top can also be an 
indicator of the progression of the pattern. Volume usually 
rises on advances, but less so in the right shoulder. 
However, there is no clear rule as to volume requirements in 
this pattern. 
A reversal of trend is often indicated by this pattern. 
According to analysts, this reversal of trend occurs because 
"supply overcomes demand" (p. 63, Edwards and Magee, 1992). 
More specifically, they describe the left shoulder as 
occurring because a well-informed group expects price to rise 
perhaps due to good anticipated company earnings and then 
begins to quietly buy shares. Other potential buyers find few 
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offerings and they must increase their bids to make the 
purchase. An advance begins. The good news is made public 
which further pushes prices up and others are attracted by the 
rising price. 
Now the well-informed group wants to begin selling, but 
does it slowly such that profits are not lost by a sudden 
dumping of their shares. A lull in demand occurs perhaps 
because prospective buyers sense the increase in supply. The 
group now begins to stop selling and may even buy back some 
shares to stop the decline. This completes the "left 
shoulder". 
The "head" begins when an advance resumes and a new wave 
of demand occurs as price reaches above the previous high of 
the "left shoulder". The group again continues to slowly sell 
its shares, before the second wave of demand is exhausted. At 
that point, prices begin to decline which completes the 
"head". 
A second, "right shoulder" occurs when, at the low, 
traders who were waiting for the prices to go back below the 
head begin to buy while those who were anxious to sell on the 
decline are finally able to get out. This action causes a 
minor reaction or temporary boost of prices followed by a 
steady decline. 
For technical traders, the signal to sell after a Head 
and Shoulders Top has developed comes when price closes below 
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the neckline by approximately 3% of the market price. This 
constitutes a "breakout" or signal. 
Although there are many variations of the Head and 
Shoulders Top (such as the case where there are two left and 
two right shoulders), this study focused only on the simple 
case described above. 
2. Symmetrical Triangle 
A Symmetrical Triangle is formed when prices fluctuate up 
and down but where these fluctuations become smaller as they 
progress. Before constructing a triangle, there must be four 
reversals of minor trend since the Symmetrical Triangle 
appears with two "boundary lines" which meet at an apex. Each 
boundary line can only be constructed after two local maxima 
or two local minima have been found. The apex is always to 
the right so the triangle appears to lie on its side. 
The Symmetrical Triangle may indicate a temporary 
aberration from trend (consolidation) or a reversal of trend. 
There is seldom any clue given on the chart to tell in which 
direction prices will break out of the triangle until the 
action finally occurs (Edwards and Magee, 1992). 
Triangles occur, supposedly, because the market 
participants are unsure which way trend will go. As Edwards 
and Magee (1992) describe, a triangle is formed when prices 
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begin to rise, say from 20 to 40. No reason is provided for 
this initial advance by the authors. As some investors see 
such a price, they begin to sell and price falls say to 25. 
Other would-be investors who watched price rise to 40 but were 
unwilling to buy then now enter the trading which brings price 
up again, say to 35. At that point, the investors who saw 
price rise to 40 but failed to grab any profits may have 
decided to be less greedy and sell at 35, sending price 
downward again. As this example demonstrates, the Triangle 
exemplifies "doubt, vacillation, stalling, until finally a 
decision is reached" and prices break from the pattern (p. 
110, Edwards and Magee, 1992). 
For technical traders, the signal to buy or sell after a 
Symmetrical Triangle has formed occurs when prices close by 
about a 3 percent margin beyond the boundary line. Although 
this signal can occur if prices rise above or below the 
boundary lines, if prices rise above the boundary line, then 
the signal occurs only if volume rises as well. 
3. Rectangle 
The Rectangle formation resembles that of the Symmetrical 
Triangle. It consists of a series of side-wise price 
fluctuations bounded on the top and bottom by horizontal or 
near-horizontal lines. 
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Also like the Symmetrical Triangle, the Rectangle may-
indicate either a temporary aberration from trend 
(consolidation) or a reversal of trend. No advance notice 
about which way prices will break through the pattern is 
apparent. 
While it appears that the only difference between 
Symmetrical Triangles and Rectangles is the slope of the 
boundary lines, Edwards and Magee (1992) characterize the 
Rectangle as resulting from a conflict between two groups of 
traders rather than resulting from doubt. These two groups 
are owners of stock who wish to dispose of their shares at a 
certain price and others who wish to accumulate the stock at a 
certain, lower figure. The holders of stock may be an 
investment trust or perhaps a large individual shareholder, 
each of which has a good reason for wanting to sell at the top 
price. The potential buyers could also be an investment trust 
or group of insiders who wish to buy at the bottom. In any 
case, these two opposing groups "bat the ball back and forth 
(up and down, that is) between them until ultimately, and 
usually quite suddenly, one team is exhausted (or changes its 
mind) and the other then proceeds to knock the ball out of the 
lot" (p. 142, Edwards and Magee, 1992). 
Therefore, prices may break out of the pattern in either 
direction. For technical traders, the signal or buy or sell 
occurs when prices close by about, a 3 percent margin beyond 
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the boundary line. Higher volume must also occur when prices 
break out above the boundary line. 
E. Programming to Detect Patterns 
In the last section, the three patterns were described. 
While for technical traders, detecting these patterns is a 
subjective "art", this study has attempted to make the 
detection of patterns more objective by constructing programs 
to detect them. All programs were written using RATS 
(Regression Analysis of Time Series), version 4.0. 
1. Head and Shoulders Top program 
A program to detect the Head and Shoulders Top must find 
three consecutive local maxima where the second is higher than 
the other two. The Head and Shoulders pattern is generally 
one which occurs over relatively long time periods, from 
several weeks to several months. In order to make sure that 
the program was detecting local maxima which occurred over 
longer time periods, two elements were added to this program. 
First, the series was smoothed by taking a ten-day moving 
average (two trading weeks). A one-week smooth was not as 
effective in minimizing the minor ups and downs which should 
be irrelevant in detecting such a long-term pattern. Second, 
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local maxima were chosen as a two-week high. That way, there 
was at least a two-week period between local maxima. The 
maximum chosen over a one-week period was not as adept at 
finding what appeared to be the pattern. 
The program was therefore designed to perform the 
following tasks: 1) smooth the series, 2) detect three 
consecutive local maxima, 3) determine if the second of the 
three maxima was the greatest, 4) continue the filtering 
process until all patterns were found, and 5) record a "hit" 
for each pattern found and sum up the hits across the series. 
Figure 3.3 depicts a Head and Shoulders Top found by this 
program in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The actual and 
smoothed series are shown. Also depicted is a neckline which 
was used in later programs to detect sell signals. 
2. Symmetrical Triangle program 
A program which detects Symmetrical Triangles must find 
two alternating local maxima and local minima where the second 
maximum is lower than the first and the second minimum is -
higher than the first. These extrema are then used to 
construct boundary lines which are necessary to detect a 
signal to buy or sell. The boundary lines meet at an apex so 
the pattern resembles a triangle on its side. 
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Figure 3.3. Example of Head and Shoulders Top 
found in the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average. 
While it was advantageous to use smoothing in the 
previous program, the Symmetrical Triangle program did not 
smooth the series since the pattern represents sharp 
vacillations in price. In addition, according to Edwards and 
Magee (1992), about three-quarters of Triangles turn out to be 
consolidation patterns rather than reversal patterns which 
take longer to develop. Therefore, local extrema were 
determined as a weekly (five-day) maximum or minimum. 
The Symmetrical Triangle program progresses by 1) finding 
four alternating minima and maxima, 2) determining if the 
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second maximum is less than the first and if the second 
minimum is greater than the first, 3) continuing the filtering 
process at the point after the first extremum is found, and 4) 
recording a "hit" if a triangle is found and siamming these 
numbers across each series. 
An example of the Symmetrical Triangle found in the 
Procter and Gamble series is depicted in Figure 3.4. This is 
an example of a reversal where prices change direction (at 
least temporarily). 
Sifimettiiil Tilmgle 
Fitctir inf Giible 
Figure 3.4. Example of the Symmetrical Triangle 
in the Procter and Gamble series. 
3. Rectangle program 
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Like the Symmetrical Triangle program, a program which 
detects Rectangles must find two alternating local maxima and 
local minima. However, in this case, the maxima must be equal 
(or nearly so) and the minima must be equal (or nearly so) to 
construct two horizontal (or nearly-horizontal) boundary lines 
through each set. 
Since this study also looked at the Symmetrical Triangle 
pattern which is similar in nature except for the slope of the 
boundary lines, it was necessary to strike a balance between 
making the requirement of horizontal boundary lines for the 
Rectangle fairly strict to differentiate it from the Triangle 
and allowing some leeway in the slope requirement to ensure 
that patterns which technical traders would call Rectangles 
are detected by the program. Keeping this balance in mind, 
the program allowed the boundary line slope to be up to 0.05 
in absolute value with not more than a 0.05 difference in 
absolute value between the two slopes. This figure was 
determined by running the filter through the actual price 
series with alternate slopes of 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 in 
absolute value. The lowest value was too restrictive to 
detect many patterns while the highest value detected patterns 
which appeared more like convergent or divergent Triangles. 
A second step taken in the program which differed from 
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the Symmetrical Triangle program was that the series was 
smoothed using a five-day (one week) moving average. 
Smoothing was used in this case because the two extreme 
boundary prices are key to the vacillating movement within the 
Rectangles and not the small movements within the Rectangle. 
Therefore, the program 1) smoothed the series, 2) 
detected four alternating extrema, 3) constructed boundary 
lines through the extrema, 4) determined whether the slopes of 
the boundary lines met the slope criteria discussed above, 5) 
recorded a "hit" if the criteria were met and computed the 
total hits per series, and 6) continued the filtering process. 
An example of a Rectangle with boundary lines found in 
the Alcoa series is in Figure 3.5. This example depicts the 
boundary lines, the actual series, and the smoothed series 
through which the boundary lines are determined. 
F. Monte Carlo Analysis 
Having described the models that were estimated for each 
of the four stock price series and the pattern detection 
programs, a description of the Monte Carlo simulation methods 
may be addressed. This analysis is used to answer the 
question if patterns occur more frequently in actual stock 
price series than they do in random series. 
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Figure 3.5. Example of a Rectangle in the 
Aluminum Company of America series. 
1. A description of Monte Carlo methods 
Monte Carlo experiments are often used in econometric 
studies, as well as in this study, to help determine the 
finite-sample properties of estimators and test statistics. 
In most Monte Carlo work, quantities of interest are 
approximated by generating many random realizations of some 
stochastic process and then averaging them in some way 
(Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). Just one example of Monte 
Carlo work used in an econometric study was completed by 
Dickey and Fuller (197 9) on unit root processes. Under a null 
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hypothesis of nonstationarity, OLS testing of a unit root 
process is inappropriate. Dickey and Fuller proposed a method 
to devise appropriate critical values for this test. They 
generated thousands of time series using three models: a 
simple random walk, a random walk with drift, and a random 
walk with drift and linear time trend. For each generated 
series, they then estimated the value of the coefficient and 
standard error when a simple OLS regression was run. With 
these estimates. Dickey and Fuller could construct a 
distribution to detect how far these estimates were away from 
unity. For the simple random walk, for example, they found 
that 95% of the estimated values were within 1.95 standard 
errors from unity. 
In this study, the object of the experiment is similar to 
that of Dickey and Fuller. It was to determine appropriate 
critical values for a distribution of the number of times each 
pattern is found in each stock price series. With these 
critical values, a test of the null hypothesis could be 
conducted. 
Each Monte Carlo experiment must specify three factors. 
First, there must be a model and its estimators or test 
statistics. In this experiment, the "models" are the patterns 
and the "test statistic" is the number of times a pattern is 
found in a particular stock price series. Second, each Monte 
Carlo experiment must specify a data-generating process (DGP). 
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In this study, the DGP is the ARCH or ARCH-M model estimated 
for each stock price series and error terms which have been 
bootstrapped. The DGP and bootstrapping method will be 
described in detail in the next section. Third, each Monte 
Carlo experiment must specify the number of replications to be 
performed. Typical numbers used are large: 1000, 2000, 5000, 
or 10,000. 
This experiment proceeds by generating a single series 
from the DGP and calculating the test statistic (the niomber of 
times a pattern is found). It is repeated ten thousand times 
so there are ten thousand replications of this test statistic 
which constitutes a sample distribution of the number of times 
a pattern is found within the randomly generated series. The 
number of replications used was large to minimize experimental 
error. The sample distribution is then used to determine 
critical values for the number of times a pattern is found 
within a given series. The statistic estimated from the 
actual price series is then compared with these critical 
values to test the null hypothesis. 
2. Bootstrapping and the data-generating process 
The idea of bootstrapping is to use an available data set 
in a Monte Carlo experiment to approximate the distribution of 
error terms in the relevant data-generating process. In an 
experiment involving stock prices, it may be particularly-
appropriate to use this bootstrapping method. As was apparent 
from the literature review, there is no well-accepted, easily 
identified model of stock prices. Indeed, when stock price 
models are estimated, the error terms often exhibit a high 
degree of kurtosis. With this in mind, it would be a mistake 
to use error terms generated from some normal or uniform 
distribution to simulate the random series. Therefore, in 
this experiment, bootstrapping is an ideal method to use in 
the DGP. 
The bootstrapping portion of the experiment proceeded as 
follows. First, the residuals were calculated from the 
estimated stock price models and then stored. Second, the 
residuals were boostrapped to generate ten thousand series for 
each stock price model and each pattern. This means that the 
series of residuals used to generate each simulated stock 
price series was determined by randomly resampling the actual 
residual series with replacement. Thus, each bootstrap sample 
of residuals contained some of the original observations more 
than once and others of them not at all. Third, the 
appropriate pattern detection program was run through each of 
the series and the number of times each pattern was detected 
was recorded. 
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G. Programming to Detect Signals to Buy and Sell 
While the Monte Carlo analysis is used to answer one 
question posed in this study, a second question remains: can 
technical trading rules earn investors excess returns, 
ignoring transactions costs? To answer this question, 
programs were developed for each pattern examined to extend 
the pattern detection process such that it also found 
appropriate technical trading signals to buy and sell. 
These new programs were run on each stock price series 
for each pattern to calculate the returns for a $1 million 
trade upon each signal. Statistics on average returns for 
each strategy and each stock series were tabulated as well as 
on the total present value of all signal returns. 
1. Head and Shoulders Top 
The Head and Shoulders Top, according to technical 
traders, occurs when there is a reversal of trend from up to 
down. Therefore, this pattern produces a signal in some 
instances to sell stock. 
The signal itself is generated when the market price 
closes by approximately 3 percent below the "neckline" after 
the "right shoulder" has been completed (Edwards and Magee, 
1992). Thus, a program necessary- to detect the signal was 
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designed to 1) find the Head and Shoulders Top pattern, 2) 
compute a neckline, 3) detect the signal, if relevant, and 4) 
compute profits from any signal for short-selling and then 
purchasing shares after various short-sell periods. 
The pattern detection program as described in section El 
above was therefore expanded to find the signal and compute 
profits. The neckline is drawn on charts as tangent to the 
two local minima from the smoothed series on either side of 
the "head". To compute the neckline, the program found these 
local minima and then made a neckline through them. Then, the 
point of intersection between the actual stock price series 
and the neckline occurring after the right shoulder maximum 
was detected and the market price recorded, if applicable.^ 
If, for a 50-day period after the development of the right 
shoulder, the stock price series fell by at least 3 percent of 
the recorded neckline market price, a signal was detected to 
sell. Since there were no guidelines for an appropriate 
duration to short-sell, three different periods were examined. 
Returns were calculated for two- five- or ten-day periods from 
the signal date by multiplying the $1 million investment times 
the rate of return: ((p(t) - p(t+i))/ p(t)), where i is the 
short-sell period. This RATS program is in Appendix B. 
^With smoothing using the centered 10-day moving averge, 
it is conceivable that actual stock prices could have fallen 
sharply such that this program may have detected a right 
shoulder before technical traders could without the advance 
knowledge of prices. 
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2 . Syiranetrical Triangle 
While the Head and Shoulders Top produces a sell signal, 
the Symmetrical Triangle formation may indicate a signal to 
buy if the price rises above the upper boundary line or a 
signal to sell if the price declines below the lower boundary 
line. 
A signal is generated when market prices close by 
approximately 3 percent beyond the boundary line before the 
apex is reached (Edwards and Magee, 1992). Thus, the program 
to detect this signal was designed to 1) find the Symmetrical 
Triangle, 2) compute upper and lower boundary lines, 3) detect 
the apex as the intersection of the boundairy lines, 4) detect 
the signal to buy or sell, if relevant, and 5) compute returns 
from the signal for various holding periods. 
The Symmetrical Triangle detection program described in 
section E2 above was expanded to find the appropriate signal 
and to compute returns. To construct the upper boundary line, 
the program extended a line through the two local maxima found 
to detect the formation. The lower boundary line was 
constructed by connecting the two local minima. Then, the 
point of intersection between the two lines (the apex of the 
Triangle) was recorded. The next step was to detect the point 
where prices intersected either boundary line after the 
Symmetrical Triangle formation had occurred. This "breakout 
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point" could come only after all four local extremum were in 
place and before the apex was reached. Therefore, the program 
had to define two separate cases to know the appropriate 
starting point for a breakout detection. If the triangle 
began with a local maximum, then the pattern could only be 
completed and a starting point recorded for a breakout signal 
after the second local minimum was detected. If, however, the 
Symmetrical Triangle began with a local minimum, the starting 
point for a breakout signal could occur only after the second 
local maximum. 
Given the period between this starting value and the 
apex, a breakout signal could occur through either the upper 
or lower boundary line. If the stock price series exceeded 
the upper boundary line by 3 percent before the apex was 
reached, a signal was recorded for an "up breakout". If the 
series fell below the lower boundary by 3 percent before the 
apex was reached, a signal was recorded for a "down breakout". 
As Edwards and Magee (1992) describe, an "up breakout" 
must be confirmed by a marked increase in trading volume. 
However, a "down breakout" as in the case of a Head and 
Shoulders Top does not require confirmation by a pickup in 
activity. Therefore, for "up breakouts", average volume over 
the ten-day period prior to the signal was computed and the 
signal for an "up breakout" was confirmed only if volume on 
the signal date exceeded that average. 
84 
Returns for either breakout were then computed. An "up 
breakout" is a signal to buy. Returns were computed for 
purchasing stock at the signal price and then selling after 
various holding periods. For each signal, this number was 
calculated by taking $1 million times the rate of return 
generated for this i-day holding period: ((p(t+i) - p(t))/ 
p(t)). Again, since there were no specific guidelines for an 
appropriate holding period, three were examined: two- , five-
and ten-day periods. A "down breakout" is a signal to sell. 
Returns in this case were computed just as under the Head and 
Shoulders Top. The RATS program is in Appendix C. 
3. Rectangle 
Like the Symmetrical Triangle, the Rectangle can produce 
a signal to buy if closing prices rise 3 percent above the 
upper boundary line and if volume confirms this movement or a 
signal to sell if closing prices fall 3 percent below the 
lower boundary line (Edwards and Magee, 1992). 
Therefore, a program to detect a signal was designed to 
1) find the Rectangle formation, 2) compute the boundary 
lines, 3) detect the signal to buy or sell, if relevant, and 
4) compute returns from the signal for various holding 
periods. 
The Rectangle detection program described in E3 above was 
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expanded to find the relevant signals and to compute returns. 
Boundary lines had already been constructed in the detection 
program as joining the two local maxima in the smoothed series 
(the upper boundary line) and the two local minima in the 
smoothed series (the lower boundary line). As was mentioned 
before, the Rectangle was only detected if the slopes of the 
boundary lines met criteria for being near-horizontal. 
As with the Symmetrical Triangle signal program, a 
breakout could only occur after all extrema were in place and 
the Rectangle formation was therefore defined. If the actual 
stock price series exceeded the upper boundary line by 3 
percent at any point up to a 50-day period from the time the 
Rectangle was defined, a signal was recorded for an "up 
breakout". If the price series fell below the lower boundary 
by 3 percent at any point up to a 50-day period from the time 
the Rectangle was defined, a signal was recorded for a "down 
breakout". The "up breakout" was confirmed only if volume on 
the signal date exceeded a prior ten-day average. 
Returns for either breakout were recorded in the same 
manner as for the Symmetrical Triangle. The RATS program is 
in Appendix D. 
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IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Monte Carlo experiments were conducted to test the null 
hypothesis that technical trading patterns occur just as 
frequently in actual stock price series as they do in random 
series generated to mimic stock prices. From these 
experiments, critical values were determined. In general, the 
null hypothesis could not be rejected at a 10% significance 
level for the two-tailed test. The results of these 
experiments are discussed in the next section. 
Programs were also designed to detect three different 
technical trading patterns and to compute returns generated by 
exploiting signals to buy or sell given $1 million was traded 
upon each signal. These programs are in Appendix B through D. 
T-tests were conducted on average profits generated by 
following these technical trading signals ignoring transaction 
costs. The results indicate that none of the patterns in the 
four stock series generate consistent and significantly 
positive returns. Indeed, in most cases, average returns were 
negative. This finding indicates that, in general, these 
patterns cannot be exploited to consistently generate excess 
profits as technical traders believe. A discussion of these 
results is in the second section below. 
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A. Monte Carlo Results 
This section will be divided into three parts. The first 
part will discuss the results of the Monte Carlo experiments 
to determine critical values for the number of times a Head 
and Shoulders Top occurs in random stock price series 
generated to mimic four different price series. The second 
part examines results for the Symmetrical Triangle for each of 
these series and the last part examines the Rectangle 
formation. These results are summarized in Table 4.1. 
1. Head and Shoulders Top 
Construction of the Head and Shoulders Top filter was 
discussed in the Methods section. The pattern itself appears 
like three humps with the middle hump being the highest. In 
the Monte Carlo experiments, this filter was run through ten 
thousand randomly-generated series chosen to mimic each 
of the four stock price series and the niamber of times the 
pattern was found was recorded. The generation of the random 
series for each of the stocks and the results of the Monte 
Carlo experiments for each stock are discussed in the 
following sections. 
Table 4.1. Results of the Monte Carlo experiments. 
Pattern Series # hits 
actual 
series 
# hits 
below 
actual 
# hits 
above 
actual 
5% lower 
boundary 
95% upper 
boundary 
Reject 
Ho 
Head and 
Shoulders 
Top 
DJIA 40 3643 5336 34 ( 5.48%) 48 (5.4%) No 
AA 43 8044 1362 33 { 6.59%) 46 (5.29%) No 
GM 33 1513 7732 30 ( 6.0%) 42 (7.95%) No 
PG 32 1226 8118 30 ( 7.28%) 42 (7.19%) No 
Symmetrical 
Triangle 
DJIA 134 1803 7986 124 ( 5.08%) 166 (5.65%) No 
AA 150 9046 834 114 ( 5.39%) 154 (5.35%) No 
GM 148 9154 743 112 ( 5.75%) 151 (5.37%) No 
PG 161 10000 0 95 ( 5.8%) 131 (5.62%) Yes 
Rectangle DJIA 1 7568 613 0 (75.68%) 2 (6.13%) No 
AA 9 4731 5004 0 { 5.05%) 191 (5.04%) No 
GM 22 2171 7725 8 ( 5.76%) 428 (5.0%) No 
PG 15 8943 940 0 { 5.65%) 22 (5.24%) No 
Parentheses indicate percentage of series contained within boundary. 
00 
00 
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a. Dow Jones Industrial Average 
As discussed in the Methods section, the univariate model 
chosen to estimate the Dow Jones Industrial Average was an 
ARCH-M: 
log Pt-i"*" 0.001251+ 0.15et._i- 0.109^ 35^ + 
i2t=0. 00005938+ 0.295et-i. 
In order to generate the random series for Monte Carlo 
experiments, the fitted residuals, which drive price in the 
equation above, had to be collected. An initial value of Eq = 
0 was assigned. Using this initial value, the h^ series is 
determined using the second equation above. Since the Pt 
series is known, the residuals could then be found using the 
first equation. 
For the Monte Carlo experiments, the idea became to 
generate a Pt series given the bootstrapped residuals. Each 
series was generated by using an initial value, Po, equal to 
the actual starting Dow price of 685.47 and bootstrapped error 
terms, e^, using the following formula to transform the series 
to levels: 
pt=exp [log Pt.i+ 0.001251+ 0.156^.1 
- 0.109^ 0.00005938+ 0.295e|.i + ej . 
This Pt series was then smoothed by a 10-day moving average 
and the number of times the Head and Shoulders Top pattern was 
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found in the series was recorded. This experiment was 
repeated ten thousand times. 
A distribution for the number of "hits" found in each of 
these random series is in Figure 4.1. Approximately five 
percent or 548 series generated 34 or fewer hits and 540 
series generated 48 or more hits. Therefore, approximate 5 
percent critical values for each of the tails were 34 and 48. 
Since the Dow Jones Industrial Average recorded 40 Head and 
Shoulders Tops, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. It 
could not be concluded that the Head and Shoulders Top 
occurred more frequently in the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
than in random series. 
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Figure 4.1. Head and Shoulders hits for 
simulations of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. 
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b. Aluminum Company of America 
For Aluminiam Company of America, the univariate model 
chosen to estimate the series was an ARCH, as discussed in the 
Methods section: 
log Pt~^og Pt-i+ 0.1276615841et_i+ 
In this case, the sequence is driving the price sequence. 
To determine the actual series, an initial value for Eq = 0 
was assigned. Given this value and the price sequence, the 
first equation above can be used to determine the errors and 
then the second equation is used to determine the Vt 
sequence: 
This Vt sequence was stored for bootstrapping in the Monte 
Carlo experiments. 
In the Monte Carlo experiments, each series was generated 
by using an initial value, Po, equal to the actual Alcoa 
starting price of 64, an initial value of Eq equal to zero, 
and using the bootstrapped variance series, Vt. The following 
formulas were used to generate the error series, e^, and to 
generate the price series, transformed to levels: 
et=Vj.\/0. 002630749+ 0 .17429087l€| (13) 
et=log Pt-log Pt_i- 0 .127661584l€t_i 
Vj.+i=€t+i(0 .0002630749+ 0 .174290B71e|) (14) 
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et=Vty'0 . 0002630749+ 0 .17429087le^-i (15) 
Pt=exp[log Pt-i"*" 0 .12766l5841e(..i+ e^.] . 
This Pt series was then smoothed using a 10-day moving 
average. The number of times the Head and Shoulders Top 
formation was found in this series was recorded. This process 
continued for the ten thousand replications. A distribution 
for the number of "hits" found in each of these random series 
is in Figure 4.2. Approximately 5 percent of the 10,000 
series (659) generated 33 or fewer hits and 529 series 
generated 46 or more hits. Since the actual Alcoa series 
exhibited 43 hits, this value fell within the critical values 
of 33 and 46 so the null hypothesis could not be rejected. 
25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 
Actwl Miiet had43 hiti 
10,000 ropUcttioQi 
Figure 4.2. Head and Shoulders Top hits for 
simulated Alcoa price series. 
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c, General Motors 
For General Motors, the univariate model chosen to 
estimate this series in the Methods section was an ARCH: 
log Pt=log Pt-i" 0.03659et_2+ 
et=Vt[0.  000122+ 0.156et-i+ 0 .126e|_2 (16) 
+ 0.08352et-3+ 0.085l€t-4+ 0.06052e|_5] .  
As with the Alcoa series, the actual variance series, Vt, had 
to be determined for bootstrapping in the Monte Carlo 
experiments. From the first equation above, the residuals can 
be determined by assigning five initial errors as zero and 
using the known price sequence. The variance sequence could 
then be determined using the second equation. 
In the Monte Carlo experiments, each random series was 
generated using an initial value, Po, equal to the actual 
General Motors starting price of 55.25, and initial five 
errors, e^, equal to zero, and using the bootstrapped variance 
series, Vt. The following formulas were therefore used to 
generate the error series, e^, and the price series 
transformed to levels: 
et=Vt[0 .  000122+ 0.156€t- i+ 0 .126€t-2 
+ 0.08352et-3+ 0.0851e|_4+ 0 .  06 052e|.5] (17) 
P(.=exp[log Pt-i~ 0.03659€t_2+ • 
This Pt series was smoothed and the number of "hits" was 
recorded for each of the ten thousand replications. A 
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distribution for the number of hits found in these random 
series is in Figure 4.3. Approximately 5 percent of the 
10,000 series (600) generated 30 or fewer hits and 795 series 
generated 42 or more hits. Since the actual General Motors 
series generated 33 hits, this value fell between the critical 
values so the null hypothesis that the Head and Shoulders Top 
occurs just as frequently in the actual price series as it 
does in random series could not be rejected. 
d. Procter and Gamble 
For Procter and Gamble, the estimated model was an ARCH-
M: 
log Pt=log Pt.i+ 2 . 5272014019i2t+ Ct (ig) 
hf.=0 . 0001245635+ 0 . 2407205633e|.i 
Since the residual series is driving prices here, the 
series was determined for bootstrapping purposes in Monte 
Carlo experiments. Just as with the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average series, given the initial value, Eq = 0, the h^ series 
is determined from the second equation and given prices, the 
residual series is determined from the first equation above. 
In the Monte Carlo experiments, each series was generated 
using the actual starting value of the Procter and Gamble 
series, Po = 88.375, and bootstrapping the error terms found 
above, Et, using the following formula which transforms the 
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Figure 4.3. Head and Shoulders Top hits for 
simulations of General Motors. 
series to levels: 
pt=exp [log Pt_i+ 2 .57272014019i2t+ ej 
i2t=0. 0001245635+ 0 .2407205633e|.i. 
The Pt series was smoothed and the Head and Shoulders Top 
detection program run through it to determine the number of 
"hits". 
Ten thousand replications of this process produced the 
distribution of hits in Figure 4.4. Approximately 5 percent 
of the 10,000 random series (728) had 30 or fewer hits and 719 
series had 42 or more hits. Since the actual Procter and 
Gamble series produced 32 hits, the null hypothesis could not 
be rejected. 
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Figure 4.4. Head and Shoulders Top for 
simulations of Procter and Gamble. 
e. General conclusions about the Head and Shoulders Top 
A Monte Carlo study has revealed that, for the four stock 
price series used, it is not possible to reject the null 
hypothesis that this pattern occurs more frequently in the 
actual stock price series than in random series which mimic 
stock price movements. This piece of evidence contradicts 
technical traders' claims that this pattern is not the result 
of random movements in stock prices. 
Although it may be argued that it is these estimated 
models which allow the generated series to behave much like 
stock price series and that the generated series would 
therefore reflect these patterns, the errors which generate 
the series are randomly chosen from the true distribution. 
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Therefore, any "trends" or "reversal movements" which occur in 
the generated series are completely random. These findings 
indicate that the Head and Shoulders Top pattern is just as 
consistent with a random model as a "mass psychology" model. 
2. Symmetrical Triangle 
Construction of the Symmetrical Triangle filter was 
discussed in the Methods section. The Symmetrical Triangle is 
a pattern which looks like a triangle on its side, with the 
apex on the right. The following sections describe the 
results of the Monte Carlo experiments which detect how many 
times the Symmetrical Triangle is found in each of the ten 
thousand generated series across each stock price series. 
a. Dow Jones Industrial Average 
For the Dow Jones Industrial Average, the generation of 
random series for Monte Carlo experiments occurred in the same 
manner for the Symmetrical Triangle as for the Head and 
Shoulders Top. Although the generated series had been 
smoothed to detect the Head and Shoulders pattern, no 
smoothing was used to detect the Symmetrical Triangle 
formation. 
The Symmetrical Triangle detection program was run on 
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each of the ten thousand random series generated and the 
number of times the pattern was found in each series was 
recorded. A distribution for the number of these "hits" found 
in the random series is reflected in Figure 4.5. 
Approximately 5 percent (508) of the 10,000 series generated 
124 or fewer hits and 565 series generated 166 or greater 
hits. Since the Dow Jones Industrial Average exhibited 134 
Symmetrical Triangles over the 34-year period, and since the 
critical values were 124 and 166 hits, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that Symmetrical Triangles occur just as 
frequently in random series as they do in the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average. 
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Figure 4.5. Symmetrical Triangle for the 
simulated Dow Jones Industrial 
Average. 
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b. Alinniniim Company of America 
The generation of random series for Monte Carlo 
experiments occurred in the same manner for Alcoa when 
detecting the Symmetrical Triangle as when detecting the Head 
and Shoulders Top. For ten thousand replications, the number 
of times the Symmetrical Triangle was found in these random 
series was computed. The distribution of these "hits" is in 
Figure 4.6. The approximate 5 percent critical values were 
114 and 154 since 539 of 10,000 series had 114 or fewer hits 
and 535 series had 154 or more hits. The Alcoa series itself 
exhibited 150 Symmetrical Triangles so the null hypothesis 
could not be rejected. 
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Actm] cerici had 150 hiti 
10,000 repUomdons 
Figure 4.6. Syinmetrical Triangle for 
simulations of Alcoa. 
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c. General Motors 
Random series which mimic the General Motors stock price 
series were generated for the Monte Carlo experiment as 
described in the Head and Shoulders Top section. The number 
of Symmetrical Triangles that was found in each of the ten 
thousand replications is shown in Figure 4.7. One hundred 
twelve or fewer hits occurred in 575 of these 10,000 series 
(about 5 percent) while 151 or more hits occurred in 537 
series. One hundred forty-eight Symmetrical Triangles were 
found in the General Motors series over the same time period 
so the null hypothesis could not be rejected. 
86 90 94 98 102 106 110 114 118 122 126 130 134 138 142 146 190 154 198 162 166 170 174 178 182 
Actial leriea had 148 hiti 
10,000 repliottiofu 
Figure 4.7. Symmetrical Triangle for 
simulations of General Motors. 
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d. Procter and Gamble 
Ten thousand random series were generated in the same 
manner for the Symmetrical Triangle Monte Carlo experiment as 
they were for the Head and Shoulders Top formation. A 
distribution of the number of Symmetrical Triangles found in 
each series is in Figure 4.8. The approximate 5 percent 
critical values were 95 and 131 hits but the Procter and 
Gamble series exhibited 161 hits. In fact, none of the 
simulated series had more than 158 hits. Therefore, unlike 
all the other cases in this study, the null hypothesis that 
this pattern occurs just as frequently in randomly generated 
series as it does in the actual stock price series can be 
rejected at even the one percent critical level. 
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Figure 4.8. Symmetrical Triangle for 
simulations of Procter and Gamble. 
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Perhaps more importantly, technical traders may argue 
that the Symmetrical Triangle formation which occurred more 
frequently in this series could have been used to generate 
excess profits. This argument is examined in the second part 
of this chapter and will be shown to be false. In fact, 
average returns for this pattern and the Procter and Gamble 
stock price series are negative across all cases studied. 
Therefore, even if the frequency with which the Symmetrical 
Triangle was found in the Procter and Gamble series is 
important to predict stock price movements, as technical 
traders believe, the ability of chartists to earn excess 
profits from finding this pattern is called into question. 
3. Rectangle 
The construction of the Rectangle filter was discussed in 
the Methods section. This pattern is composed of four 
alternating extrema where the two maxima are approximately of 
the same height and two minima which are also of approximately 
the same height. It should be noted that in the Monte Carlo 
experiments, the distributions which occur from the ten 
thousand replications across each price series appear 
dramatically different from the previous studies. 
Specifically, these distributions are skewed to the right. 
The reason for this anomaly lies in the construction of the 
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Rectangle filter and will be discussed more below. 
a. Dow Jones Industrial Average 
The simulation of ten thousand series for the Monte Carlo 
experiments occurred for the Dow Jones Industrial Average just 
as in the two previous experiments. The Rectangle detection 
program was run on each of these generated series after 
smoothing by a five-day moving average. The distribution for 
the number of hits found in each series is in Figure 4.9. 
This distribution is skewed to the right. The reason for 
this lies in the construction of the Rectangle filter program. 
Few Rectangles were found because of the stringent condition 
that its boundary lines be nearly horizontal to ensure that it 
could not be mistaken for a Triangle. Even so, 7568 of the 
10,000 series recorded less than one hit, the number found for 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and 613 series exhibited 
more than one hit. Therefore, the null hypothesis that the 
Rectangle pattern occurs just as frequently in random series 
could not be rejected. 
b. Aluminum Company of America 
The Rectangle detection program was run on 10,000 
simulations of the Aluminum Company of America stock price 
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Figure 4.9. Rectangle for simulations of the 
Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
series as described before. The resulting distribution is in 
Figure 4.10. This distribution is a bit different than the 
one for the Dow Jones Industrial Average even though it is 
also skewed to the right. While there were many series where 
very few hits were detected because of the stringent 
conditions for detecting a Rectangle, there were also series 
where hundreds of Rectangles were found. In this case, the 
problem may also lie in the construction of the Rectangle 
detection program. While technical traders have noted that 
prices may theoretically bounce up and down between two 
boundary prices for an extended time period, this behavior was 
not detected in actual price series. Therefore, in 
constructing the detection program, the updating procedure 
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used to go from one detected Rectangle to another may be 
faulty. This program could be counting a single Rectangle 
formation several times since it only seeks four consecutive 
extrema. If a fifth extrema were to occur within the same 
boundaries, a second Rectangle would be recorded. 
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Figure 4.10. Rectangle for simulations of Alcoa. 
In any case, the Alcoa series recorded 9 Rectangles. The 
Monte Carlo experiment recorded 4731 series of 10,000 which 
had fewer than nine hits and 5004 series had more. 
Approximate five percent critical values were 0 and 191. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis could not be rejected. 
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c. General Motors 
The Rectangle detection program was run on ten thousand 
simulations of the General Motors stock price series as 
described before. Figure 4.11 depicts the resulting 
distribution of Rectangles found. This distribution exhibits 
the same skewness as the previous two and results from the 
limitations of the Rectangle detection program. Approximate 5 
percent critical values in this distribution are 8 and 428 
since 576 of 10,000 series recorded 8 or fewer hits and 500 
series recorded 428 or more hits. The General Motors series 
exhibited 22 hits so the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected. 
Actial leriei had 22 hiti 
10,000 repiiottiofit 
Figure 4.11. Rectangle for simulations of 
General Motors. 
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d. Procter and Gamble 
For ten thousand simulations of the Procter and Gamble 
series, the Rectangle detection program generated the 
distribution of hits found in Figure 4.12. Five hundred 
sixty-five of the 10,000 series generated zero hits; 524 
series generated 22 or more hits. With the Procter and Gamble 
series recording 15 hits, and critical values of zero and 22, 
the null hypothesis could not be rejected. 
e. General conclusions about the Rectangle formation 
As with the Head and Shoulder Top formation, there was no 
indication that the Rectangle formation could be detected in 
actual stock price series more frequently than in random 
series generated to mimic stock price movements. 
It should be noted that the distribution of hits looked 
much different for this formation than the previous two. In 
many cases, there were zero to very few hits recorded. In few 
cases there were very many Rectangles recorded such that the 
distributions were skewed to the right. One such reason for 
this oddity resulted from the Rectangle detection program. 
While this oddity may not be important for the Alcoa and 
General Motors series since they each had 5004 and 7725 of 
10,000 series recording greater hits, respectively, it could 
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Figure 4.12. Rectangle for simulations of 
Procter and Gamble. 
be more problematic for the other two series. Simulations of 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average resulted in 613 of 10,000 
series which recorded greater hits and Procter and Gamble 
recorded 940 of 10,000. If this program were altered to make 
sure that only one Rectangle could be detected over possibly 
longer time periods, then the numbers of hits found for 
simulations of the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the 
Procter and Gamble series that were greater than the number 
found for the actual stock price series could conceivably be 
lower and could conceivably result in a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. 
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B. Returns from Pattern Signals on Stock Prices 
In the last section, results indicated that we cannot 
conclude in most cases that the technical trading patterns 
occur more often in stock price series than they do in random 
series. This result contradicts technical traders' beliefs 
about the existence of patterns explained by a "mass 
psychology" of the stock market. 
But there remains another related question. According to 
technical traders, these patterns help investors predict price 
movements so they can exploit this knowledge for gain. The 
technical trading signals explored in this study really just 
exemplify trend chasing. For example, the signal in each case 
occurs after prices change by 3 percent and the signal 
generated is that prices are expected to continue in the same 
direction. Thus, the question is if the signals to buy or 
sell generated by these patterns are profitable. 
It should be noted that by ignoring transaction costs, 
the technical trading schemes should be favored. These 
strategies involve several rounds of buying and selling so 
transaction costs should be higher. Despite this 
consideration, in all but one of the many cases studied, 
returns under the technical trading schemes could not generate 
average returns which were significantly different from zero. 
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1. Calculating average returns 
In order to compare average returns generated by the 
three trading patterns, it was assumed that an investor traded 
$1 million upon each signal to buy or sell. Computation of 
this average return across trading signals is explained below. 
Since there were no guidelines for any of the patterns about 
how long an investor should wait to complete the trade, three 
different holding periods were considered: a short-term (2-
day) period, a medium-term (5-day) period, and a longer-term 
(10-day) period. If no signal occurred, no action was taken. 
For a buy signal generated from the Symmetrical Triangle 
or Rectangle patterns, the profit from each trade was computed 
as 
$1,000, 000 { (20) 
where i is the holding period. For a sell signal generated 
from any of the patterns, the profit from each trade was 
computed as 
$1,000, 000 { }. (21) 
For each of these patterns, stock series, and holding or 
short-sell periods, the average return and t-values were 
calculated. The average return was calculated as a simple 
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average of the profits for each stock series, each pattern and 
each holding period. T-values were calculated under the null 
hypothesis of zero returns so a two-tailed test is 
appropriate. The results are presented in Table 4.2. 
2. Average returns from the Head and Shoulders Top 
Detection of the Head and Shoulders Top may, under 
certain conditions, produce a signal to sell. As was 
mentioned in the Methods chapter, this signal comes when 
prices fall by 3 percent below the "neckline" after the right 
shoulder has been established. Since there were no guidelines 
for how long a period the short sell should last, three 
different short-sell periods were examined. 
As Table 4.2 indicates, average returns generated from 
the Head and Shoulders Top pattern could be positive or 
negative, depending on the short-sell period and the stock 
series examined. For the Dow Jones Industrial Average and 
Alcoa, the results were mixed since both positive average 
returns and negative average returns were generated depending 
on the short-sell period. However, for the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average and 5- or 10-day holding periods, the Head 
and Shoulders Top provided the highest average returns across 
all trading strategies. For General Motors, the returns were 
consistently positive and higher than for all other patterns 
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Table 4.2. Average returns from each trading strategy across 
holding or short-sell periods. 
Pattern 
Stock 
series 
Holding or short-sell period 
2-day 5-day 10-day 
Head and 
Shoulders Top 
DJIA -2410.24 
(-0.75) 
15634.18 
(0.71) 
14316.91 
(0.70) 
AA 4405.86 
(0.71) 
2109.10 
(0.22) 
-154.04 
(-0.01) 
GM 3837.35 
(0.53) 
9587.07 
(1.00) 
16428.83 
(1.52) 
PG -1923.86 
(-0.27) 
-5958.30 
(-0.51) 
-10839.87 
(-0.84) 
Symmetrical 
Triangle 
DJIA -828.62 
(-0.21) 
1246.64 
(0.21) 
3992.87 
(0.63) 
AA 7588.00** 
(2.31) 
5533.67 
(1.00) 
8560.05 
(1.38) 
GM -472.20 
(-0.11) 
-4795.10 
(-0.60) 
-2667.65 
(-0.25) 
PG -1309.60 
(-0.36) 
-3340.42 
(-0.76) 
-8643.60 
(-1.47) 
Rectangle DJIA -4443.48 -14489.60 -28802.11 
AA -2308.88 
(-0.29) 
700.31 
(0.07) 
-26144.02 
(-0.94) 
GM -7776.59 
(-1.47) 
-9672.96 
(-1.49) 
-3661.10 
(-0.32) 
PG -2592.36 
(-0.75) 
-6783.03 
(-1.55) 
6947.73 
(1.05) 
DJIA is the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
AA is Aluminum Company of America 
GM is General Motors 
PG is Procter and Gamble 
() indicates t-value 
* indicates significant at the 10% level 
** indicates significant at the 5% level 
*** indicates significant at the 1% level 
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examined. But for Procter and Gamble, they were consistently 
negative. The result for Procter and Gamble may have occurred 
since the stock price series has a very strong positive trend 
but the Head and Shoulders Top signal calls for a short-sell. 
There were also no consistently positive average returns 
across a single short-sell period. Both positive and negative 
average returns were recorded for a given holding period 
across all four stock series, however, three of four stock 
series had positive average returns for the five-day short-
sell period. 
In any case, results are mixed. The only conclusion from 
this pattern is that it cannot generate average returns which 
are significantly different from zero. This finding refutes 
technical traders' beliefs that the Head and Shoulders Top can 
not only be used to generate excess returns, but also that it 
is one of the more "reliable" patterns to use. 
3. Average returns from the Symmetrical Triangle pattern 
The Symmetrical Triangle formation can produce a signal 
to buy if prices exceed the upper boundary by 3 percent or a 
signal to sell if prices fall below the lower boundary by 3 
percent. As with the Head and Shoulders Top formation, this 
study assumed that $1 million would be used to purchase or 
short-sell upon every signal generated by this pattern. In 
114 
addition, the holding or short-sell period was again varied 
since there were no guidelines for the appropriate period to 
use. 
As Table 4.2 indicates, in only one of the twelve cases 
studied were returns significantly different from zero. For 
the Alcoa series, the Syiranetrical Triangle formation signal 
provided the highest average returns of all patterns studied 
and across all stock price series. Indeed, average returns 
were all positive for the Alcoa series but this was the only 
stock series for which this conclusion was true. For the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average, average returns were both positive 
and negative depending on the holding period and for the other 
two series, they were negative across all holding periods. 
As with the Head and Shoulders Top formation, there was 
no single holding period for which average returns were 
positive across all stock price series. While the two-day 
holding period generated average returns which were 
significantly different from zero for the Alcoa series, the 
other three series recorded negative average returns for this 
holding period. 
4. Average returns for the Rectangle formation 
As with the Symmetrical Triangle, the Rectangle formation 
can produce a signal to buy or to sell when stock prices fall 
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outside the boundary lines by 3 percent. The program used to 
detect buy or sell signals computed the return to $1 million 
for each signal produced under various holding or short-sell 
periods. 
In Table 4.2, there are no t-values reported for the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average under the Rectangle pattern. The 
reason for this is that there was only one signal generated by 
the formation so no distribution of average returns could be 
derived. 
As Table 4.2 indicates, the was no case where average 
returns were significantly different from zero. In fact, in 
only two of the twelve cases were average returns positive, 
excluding transaction costs. Therefore, like the previous two 
patterns, there is no indication for these stock series that 
the Rectangle can generate excess returns. 
As with the other two patterns, there was no single 
holding period which generated superior average returns across 
the stock series. 
Higher returns were found for only the Procter and Gamble 
series under the 10-day holding period for the Rectangle 
formation. For all other stock price series and holding 
periods, the other two formations generated higher average 
returns than the Rectangle. Part of the reason for this 
result may again come from the stringent restriction placed 
upon the detection of Rectangles since in most series, very 
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few Rectangles were found. 
5. General conclusions about average returns 
In response to the question if technical traders can earn 
consistent returns from exploiting signals generated by the 
three patterns studied here, the answer here is strongly 
negative. Even though the Head and Shoulders pattern is 
considered to be the most "reliable" by technicians in terms 
of predicting price movements and even though transaction 
costs are excluded, the Head and Shoulders Top as well as 
other patterns did not generate average returns which were 
consistently different from zero. In fact, for only one stock 
series and one holding period were returns significantly 
different from zero. Technical traders claim that they do 
earn consistent positive returns but all evidence here 
contradicts their claim. 
Chartists may argue that it is the detection of several 
different patterns within a single series which generates the 
excess returns. This argument was not specifically examined 
in this study, but it may be argued that it would take at 
least one pattern generating significantly positive returns 
for an investor to generate consistent excess returns. None 
of the patterns produced significantly positive returns across 
all holding periods in the long-run. 
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Chartists could also argue that they would not always use 
a specific holding period, but that the decision to change 
position is subjective. However, from the beginning, this 
study has attempted to take this subjective analysis and make 
it more objective. No guidelines for an appropriate holding 
period were proposed by chartists. Therefore, this study is 
attempting to be consistent by using a single holding period 
across each signal examined but looking at different possible 
holding periods. 
Another possible critique by chartists could be that 
actual decisions to buy or sell must be confirmed not only by 
the signals used in this study, but also by the simultaneous 
detection of similar patterns in other stock price series. 
While this study does not examine the simultaneity of signal 
detection, an extension of this work could focus on that 
question. 
6. Results on present value of returns 
The results for average returns calculated above do not 
take into account the timing of returns. In order to examine 
that question, another series of tests were conducted to 
calculate the present value of returns generated by the 
signals across patterns and short-sell or holding periods. 
For each signal, the present value of the returns was 
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calculated by "discounting" the value of each profit or loss 
forward. The daily interest rate used in this calculation for 
each stock price series was determined as the intercept term 
of a regression on the first log difference of each price 
series. Results of this test are presented in Table 4.3. 
Although the numbers are generally larger in magnitude 
than those for average profit returns, the conclusions remain 
the same. With the exception of General Motors, the Head and 
Shoulders Top does not generate consistent positive returns 
across short-sell periods. With the exception of Alcoa, the 
Symmetrical Triangle signal does not generate consistent 
positive returns across holding and short-sell periods. And 
for the Rectangle formation, in only one of the twelve cases 
studied is the present value of returns positive. 
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Table 4.3. Present value of profit returns from each trading 
strategy across holding periods. 
strategy 
Stock 
series 
Holding or short-sell period 
2-day 5-day 10-day 
Head and 
Shoulders Top 
DJIA -77604.89 272859.47 248776.79 
AA 146276.25 -49979.39 -322812.44 
GM 77572.25 176684.86 297737.02 
PG -34338.59 -64403.23 -228565.91 
Symmetrical 
Triangle 
DJIA -35246.07 14222.43 55112.99 
AA 499380.30 382275.67 697373.71 
GM -32625.42 -123389.66 -89063.71 
PG 2661.80 -42195.50 -408704.41 
Rectangle DJIA -6539.70 -21316.47 -42343.84 
AA -16045.97 -4496.45 -342903.38 
GM -163864.42 -218294.30 -83789.40 
PG -74028.56 -205412.56 249514.17 
DJIA is the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
AA is Aluminum Company of America 
GM is General Motors 
PG is Procter and Gamble 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. Results of the Monte Carlo Analysis 
In eleven of the twelve cases studied, the Monte Carlo 
experiments showed that the null hypothesis that patterns 
occur just as frequently in series generated to mimic stock 
price movements as they do in actual stock price series could 
not be rejected. These results refute technical traders' 
beliefs that stock price trends are perpetuated by a "mass 
psychology" of investors and that these trends exhibit 
predictable patterns. The results also constitute another 
piece of evidence in support of efficient markets since these 
stock price movements may indeed be random. 
There are limitations, however, to this part of the 
study. First, this study only examined three technical 
trading patterns and four stock price series. Since these 
patterns and series only constitute a sample, it is possible 
that the results could differ for other patterns or other 
stock price series. Second, pattern detection occurred using 
objective criteria, not subjective criteria as technical 
analysts use. One idea behind this study was to quantify 
pattern detection by writing computer programs which detect 
the three patterns. Some Wall Street firms have done the 
same. However, it is possible that some of the patterns 
detected by the program would be glossed over by chartists 
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while chartists may have found additional patterns that were 
not detected by the program. Even so, in constructing the 
detection program, graphical checks were made on the actual 
stock price series to make sure that patterns were found as 
accurately as possible and smoothing techniques were used on 
two patterns to simulate what the "eyeball" may see in price 
series. Third, the univariate models chosen to generate the 
realizations of random price series may not be the true models 
of each stock price series. However, the purpose of this 
study was to generate realizations which mimic stock price 
movements. By using these models and bootstrapping 
techniques, the realizations did exhibit comparable movements 
in prices. 
B. Returns from Technical Trading Signals 
A finding which is perhaps more important than the Monte 
Carlo analysis for technical traders is that average returns 
from their strategies were not consistently and significantly 
different from zero. In only one case of the thirty-six 
studied were average returns significantly different from 
zero. Even in that case, the results were not consistent 
across short-sell or holding periods. Technical traders 
believe that detection of the patterns studied will help them 
to predict future price movements and to earn excess profits 
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from these predictions. However, this study refutes their 
claim. These findings support the implication of the 
efficient markets hypothesis that it is impossible to earn 
consistent excess returns from technical trading schemes. 
There are limitations to this part of the study as well. 
First, as was mentioned before, only a sample of stock prices 
and patterns was used. Conclusions are therefore drawn only 
about these stock prices and patterns. Second, returns for 
the technical trading patterns were calculated for one of 
several possible holding periods. There were no technical 
trading guidelines about how long an investor should take a 
position for any of the patterns examined. Technical traders 
could disagree with applying a single holding period to 
calculate returns, but the idea of the study was to apply an 
objective measure to calculate returns. Third, a critique to 
which technical traders acknowledge their analysis is subject, 
"trends" are often exploited only after most profit can be 
earned. In this case, a signal to buy or sell occurred only 
after prices had changed by 3 percent. But these were the 
guidelines to which chartists adhere. 
C. Possible Extensions 
There are many directions in which this work can be 
extended. First, other stock price series can be used. It 
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may be interesting to extend the Monte Carlo experiments 
across international stock price indices. While this and 
other studies have found evidence in support of efficient U.S. 
markets, there have been fewer studies conducted on the 
efficiency of foreign stock markets. 
Second, other technical trading patterns can be used. 
There are numerous technical trading rules. While this study 
has focused on the more popular patterns in stock prices, 
others such as Brock et al. (1992) have concentrated on 
different technical trading rules. Their study examined the 
returns from such rules as the moving-average. These rules 
could be applied to the stock price series used here and more 
results presented. 
Third, while the stock market was the focus of this 
study, technical traders have different rules across other 
markets like currency and other futures markets. While the 
patterns examined here pertain to the stock market, different 
trading rules can be examined in other markets to determine if 
excess returns exist there. 
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APPENDIX A. MODEL ESTIMATION FOR THE STOCK PRICE SERIES 
Model estimation for the Dow Jones Industrial Average. 
Model Coefficients Function Conclusion 
Value 
Ayt=jbo+jbiet.i+et 
€t=Vt^ao+aie|_i 
bo = .000341 3.8) 
bi = .151 ( 26.8) 
tto = .00006(100.6) 
tti = .2947 ( 51.1) 
37096 Try ARCH-M 
Ayt=i)ot-i+i32V^+e 
ht=ao+a^el.j_ 
bo = .0013 ( 3.7) 
bi = .15 ( 20.7) 
b2 = -.109 (- 3.0) 
tto = .00006( 99.8) 
ai = .295 (49.9) 
37120 Try alternate 
ARCH-M. This is 
the best model. 
Ayt=iJo+i3iet_i+i32^t+€t 
i2t=«o+ai€t-i 
bo = .00049( 3.4) 
bi = .14867 ( 23.2) 
bj =-2.05 (- 1.6) 
tto = .00006( 99.8) 
tti = .29392( 48.9) 
37099 Try without MA 
process. 
Ayt.=bo+b^h^+et 
i2t=ao+ai€ti 
bo = .00037( 4.2) 
bj = -.206 (- 0.5) 
ao= .00006(111.5) 
tti = .279 ( 52.0) 
37054 MA term should 
be included. 
Ay,, is the first difference of the log of stock price at time t. 
Ec is the residual at time t. 
Vt is a white noise process. 
he is the variance of residuals at time t. 
(.) indicates t-value. 
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Model estimation for Aluminum Company of America. 
Model Coefficients Function Conclusion 
Value 
€t=Vty'ao+ai€|_i 
bi = .1277 ( 12.6) 
00 = .00026(171.1) 
01 = .17429( 22.7) 
29235 Try an ARCH-M 
model. This is 
the best model. 
Ayt=23iet.i+i32v^+et 
i2t=ao+aiet-i 
bi = .1276 ( 12.6) 
bj = .0067 ( 0.6) 
Oo = .00026(165.4) 
tti = .1739 ( 22.3) 
29235 ARCH may be 
better model. 
Check other 
ARCH-M to 
verify. 
Ay^=bo+b^h^+et 
i2t=ao+ai€t-i 
bo = .00089( 1.8) 
bi =-2.48 ( -1.8) 
(Xo= .00026(151.9) 
Oi = .190 ( 24.1) 
29175 ARCH is better. 
Avt is the first difference of the log of stock price at time t. 
Et is the residual at time t. 
is a white noise process. 
he is the variance of residuals at time t. 
(.) indicates t-value. 
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Model estimation for General Motors. 
Model Coefficients Function Conclusion 
Value 
Ayt.=jbiet-2+et 
ej.=v f.y/ARCH(5) Process 
bi =-.037 (-3 28) 
Oo = .00012(56 4) 
Oi = .156 (22 7) 
02 = .126 (13 5) 
Oj = .0835 (9 27) 
= 
.0851 (7 66) 
Os = .0605 (7 43) 
30635 Try 
alternate 
ARCH model. 
This is the 
best model. 
et=Vt\/ao+ai€|-i 
bi =-.042 (-4, .87) 
bj =-.019 (-2, .39) 
bj =-.029 (-3, .40) 
tto = .0002 (90, .4) 
tti = .207 (25. 9) 
30474 Model with 
more ARCH 
lags would 
not 
converge. 
Try ARCH-M. 
Ayt=2?let_2+i^2^/^+et 
i2t=ao+aiet-i+a2et-2 + 
a3et-3+a l^t-4 +a5et-5 
bi =-.011 (-0 31) 
bj = .0511 (1 64) 
Oo = .00007 (13 3) 
«! = .178 (6 19) 
(X2 = .0928 (2 99) 
a, = .0503 (1 71) 
= 
.0516 (2 10) 
Os = .0421 (1 77) 
4432 Try without 
MA{2) term. 
ht=ao+a^el.i+a2el-2 + 
a. .3e|.3+a4et-4+a5 eU 
bi = .0002 (0 .02) 
Oo = .0001 (57, .1) 
ai = .1551 (22 , .3) 
Oz = .1279 (13, .4) 
aj = . 0843 (9. 35) 
a4 = .0854 (7, , 66) 
Oj = .0594 (7, 38) 
30631 Try fewer 
lags for 
residual 
variance. 
ht=a. Q+n^e\.^ 
bi 
tto 
a, 
. 0 0 6  ( - 0 . 6 )  
.0002 (90.6) 
.207 (26.1) 
30445 Try 
alternate 
ARCH-M 
model. 
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Model estimation for General Motors (cont.). 
Model Coefficients Function Conclusion 
Value 
bi _ .4085 (0 .65) 30631 ARCH-M 
^y^=b,hf.+et. Oo = .0001 (57 .1) coeff. is 
1 2 2 a, 
= 
.1547 (22 .4) still 
iit=«o+aiet-i+a2e^2 + Oj = .1278 (13 .4) insignif. 
a3et-3+a4€t-4+a5et-5 : .0848 
.0857 
(9 
(7 
40) 
69) 
Try ARCH. 
<*5 .0594 (7 41) 
bo - _ .000 (-0 23) 30631 First model 
On = .0001 (56 9) is best. 
a, = .156 (22 5) 
et=v ^y/ARCH (5) Process "2 a. _ 
.128 
.0843 
(13 
(9 
5) 
36) 
a, = .0851 (7 65) 
Os .0593 (7 36) 
Ay^ is the first difference of the log of stock price at time t. 
Et is the residual at time t. 
Vt is a white noise process. 
h,. is the variance of residuals at time t. 
(.) indicates t-value. 
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Model estimation for Procter and Gamble. 
Model Coefficients Function Conclusion 
Value 
Ayt=i3o+ej. 
bo = .0004 (2.65) 
tto = .0001 (80.7) 
tti = .2404 (44.1) 
32045 This was 
simplest 
model which 
converged. 
i2t=ao+aiet-i 
bo = -.001 (-1.57) 
bi = .138 (2.01) 
tto = .0001 (80.1) 
tti = .240 (39.0) 
32047 Get rid of 
constant. 
At=ao+ai€t-i 
bi = .0308 (2.83) 
Oo = .0001 (80.9) 
ai = .2406 (43.6) 
32046 Try 
alternate 
ARCH-M. 
i2t=ao+ai€t-i 
bo = -.000 (-0.46) 
bi = 3.315 (1.74) 
tto = .0001 (80.4) 
ttj = .2401 (41.4) 
32047 Get rid of 
constant. 
i2t=ao+ai€t.i 
bi = 2.527 (3.10) 
Oo = .0001 (81.2) 
tti = .2407 (43.1) 
32046 Best model 
Ayt is the first difference of the log of stock price at time t. 
Et is the residual at time t. 
Vt is a white noise process. 
h^ is the variance of residuals at time t. 
(.) indicates t-value. 
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APPENDIX B. HEAD AND SHOULDERS TOP SIGNAL PROGRAM 
*This program will detect signal for short sell in head and shoulders top. 
cal(daily) 60 1 2 
all 0 93:7:9 
open data c:\martine\dow.prn 
data(format=free,org=obs) / dow 
set y / = dow 
set X = (y(t-4)+y(t-3)+y(t-2)+y(t-1)+y(t)+y(t+1)+y(t+2)+$ 
y(t+3)+y(t+4)+y(t+5))/lO 
do i=l,2 
compute n = 5 
compute hits = nlow = nmed = nhigh = max = 0 
compute intersects = signals = 0 
compute totalpv = 0.0 
branch loop2 
:loopl 
* if n == 8237 
if n == 8740 
branch loop5 
if max == 0 
compute n = n + 1 
if max == 0 
branch loop2 
if max == 1 
branch loop3 
• 
:loop2 
compute max = 0 
if (x(n) >= x(n+l)).and.(x(n) >= x(n-1)).and.$ 
(x(n+l) >= x(n+2)).and.(x(n-l) >= x(n-2)).and.$ 
(x(n+2) >= X(n+3)).and.(x{n-2) >= x(n-3)).and.$ 
(x(n+3) >= x(n+4)).and.(x(n-3) >= x(n-4)).and.$ 
(x(n+4) >= x(n+5)).and.(x(n-4) >= x(n-5)) 
compute max = 1 
branch loopl 
• 
:loop3 
compute flag = 0 
if nlow == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute nlow = n 
if flag == 1 
compute n = n + 1 
if flag == 1 
branch loop2 
if nmed == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute nmed = n 
if flag == 1 
compute n = n + 1 
if flag == 1 
branch loop2 
if nhigh == 0 
compute flag = 1 
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if flag == 1 
compute nhigh = n 
if X(nmed)<=x(nlow).or.x(nmed)<=x(nhigh) 
compute n = nlow + 1 
if X(nmed)>x(nlow).and.x(nmed)>x(nhigh) 
branch loop4 
compute nlow = nmed = nhigh = 0 
branch loop2 
loop4 
compute hits = hits + 1 
display 'peaks at' nlow nmed nhigh 
compute min = flag = s = 0 
compute mini = min2 = 0 
compute n = nlow 
do n=nlow,nmed 
if X(n-2)>=x(n-1).and.x(n-1)>=x(n).and.$ 
x(n)<=x(n+l).and.X(n+1)<=x(n+2) 
compute min = 1 
if (min == 1).and.(mini == 0) 
compute mini = n 
if (min == 1).and.(min2 == 0) 
compute min2 = n 
if (mini > 0).and.(min2 > 0) 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1.and.X(mini)>x(min2) 
compute mini = min2, min2 = 0 
if (flag == 1).and.(x(minl)<=x(min2)) 
compute min2 = 0 
compute min = flag = 0 
end do n 
if mini == 0 
do n=nlow,nmed 
if X(n-1)>=x(n).and.X(n)<=x(n+1) 
compute min = 1 
if (min == 1).and.(mini == 0) 
compute mini = n 
if (min == 1).and.(min2 == 0) 
compute min2 = n 
if (mini > 0).and.(min2 > 0) 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1.and.X(mini)>x(min2) 
compute mini = min2, min2 = 0 
if (flag == 1).and.(x(minl)<=x(min2)) 
compute min2 = 0 
compute min = flag = 0 
end do n 
compute min = flag = mina = minb = 0 
compute n = nmed 
do n=nmed,nhigh 
if x(n-2)>=x(n-l).and.x(n-1)>=x(n).and.$ 
x{n)<=x(n+l).and.x(n+l)<=x(n+2) 
compute min = 1 
if (min == 1).and.(mina == 0) 
compute mina = n 
if (min == 1).and.(minb == 0) 
compute minb = n 
if (mina > 0).and.(minb > 0) 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1.and.x(mina)>x(minb) 
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compute mina = minb, minb = 0 
if (flag == 1).and.(x(mina)<=x(minb)) 
compute minb = 0 
compute min = flag = 0 
end do n 
if mina == 0 
do n=nmed,nhigh 
if x(n-l)>=x(n).and.x(n)<=x(n+l) 
compute min = 1 
if (min == 1).and.(mina == 0) 
compute mina = n 
if (min == 1).and.(minb == 0) 
compute minb = n 
if (mina > 0).and.(minb > 0) 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1.and.x(mina)>x(minb) 
compute mina = minb, minb = 0 
if (flag == 1).and.(x(mina)<=x(minb)) 
compute minb = 0 
compute min = flag = 0 
end do n 
display 'troughs at' mini mina 
compute slope = (x(mina) - x(mini))/(mina - mini) 
set m = t - mina 
set neckline = slope*m + x(mina) 
do n=nhigh,(nhigh+50) 
if y(n)<=neckline(n) 
compute s = n 
if s > 0 
break 
compute n = n + 1 
end do n 
if s == 0 
display 'no intersection' 
if (s > 0) 
compute intersects = intersects + 1 
if s > 0 
do n=s,(nhigh+50) 
if n >= 8237 
if n >= 8740 
break 
if (y(n) <= .97*y(s)) 
display 'signal at' n y(n) 
if (y(n) <= .97*y(s)) 
compute signals = signals + 1 
if (y(n) <= .97*y(s)) 
compute profit = 1000000*((y(n) - y(n+2))/y(n)) 
if (y(n) <= .97*y(s)) 
compute pvalue = profit*(1 + (.0002844709*(8242 - n - 2))) 
if (y(n) <= .97*y(s)) 
display n profit pvalue 
if (y(n) <= .97*y(s)) 
compute totalpv = totalpv + pvalue 
if (y(n) <= .97*y(s)) 
break 
compute n = n + 1 
end do n 
compute n = nmed + 1 
compute nlow = nmed = nhigh = 0 
branch loop2 
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:loop5 
display 'hits =' hits 
display 'intersections=' intersects 
display 'signals=' signals 
display 'totalpv=' value 
end do i 
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APPENDIX C. SYMMETRICAL TRIANGLE SIGNAL PROGRAM 
*This program will detect pattern and signal for Symmetrical 
*Triangle pattern 
cal(daily) 62 1 2 
all 0 93:8:4 
open data c:\martine\pg.prn 
data(format=free,org=obs) / pg vol 
set X / = pg 
do i=l,2 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
compute signals = hits = 0 
compute totalpv = 0.0 
compute n = 5 
branch loopl 
•checking for max or min 
:loopl 
compute max = min = 0 
if (x(n) >= X(n+1)).and.(x(n) >= x(n-l)).and.$ 
(x(n+l) >= x(n+2)).and.(x(n-l) >= x(n-2)) 
compute max = 1 
if (x(n) <= X(n+1)).and.(x(n) <= x(n-1)).and.$ 
(x(n+l) <= X(n+2)).and.(x(n-1) <= x(n-2)) 
compute min = 1 
if max == 1 
branch loop2 
if min == 1 
branch loop3 
compute n = n + 1 
if n == 8239 
* if n == 8740 
branch loop7 
branch loopl 
*finding consecutive maxima 
:loop2 
compute flag = 0 
if maxl == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute maxl = n 
if flag == 1 
compute n = n + 1 
if flag == 1 
branch loopl 
if max2 == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute max2 = n 
if (max2 > 0).and.(min2 > 0) 
branch loop4 
compute n = n + 1 
branch loopl 
* finding consecutive minima 
:loop3 
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compute flag = 0 
if mini == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute mini = n 
if flag == 1 
compute n = n + 1 
if flag == 1 
branch loopl 
if min2 == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute min2 = n 
if (min2 > 0).and.(max2 > 0) 
branch loop4 
compute n = n + 1 
branch loopl 
:loop4 
*cases where triangles found 
if (maxl<minl).and.(minl<max2).and.(max2<min2).and.$ 
(x(maxl)>x(max2)).and.(x(minl)<x(min2)) 
branch loop5 
if (minl<maxl).and.(maxl<min2).and.(min2<max2).and.$ 
(x(maxl)>x(max2)).and.(x(mini)<x(min2)) 
branch loop5 
•updating n when no triangle found 
if maxl<minl 
compute n = maxl + 1 
if maxl>minl 
compute n = mini + 1 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
branch loopl 
:loop5 
compute hits = hits + 1 
* display 'triangle' maxl max2 mini min2 
•detecting signal for buy/sell with triangle 
compute u = d = 0 
compute upslope = (x(max2) - x(maxl)) / (max2 - maxl) 
set m = t - maxl 
set upline = upslope*m + x(maxl) 
compute loslope = (x(min2) - x(mini))/(min2 - mini) 
set p = t - mini 
set loline = loslope*p + x(minl) 
*Case where triangle begins with max 
if maxl<minl 
do n = min2,min2+100 
if loline(n) >= upline(n) 
compute s = n 
* if loline(n) >= upline(n) 
* display 'apex at' s 
if loline(n) >= upline(n) 
break 
compute n = n + 1 
end do n 
if maxl<minl 
compute n = min2 + 1 
if maxl<minl 
while n <= s { 
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if 0.97*x(n)>=upline(n) 
compute u = n 
if 1.03*x(n)<=loline(n) 
compute d = n 
* if (u > 0).or.(d > 0) 
* display 'up signal at' u 'down signal at' d 
if (u > O).or.(d > 0) 
branch loop6 
compute n = n + 1 
) 
*Case where triangle begins with min 
if maxl>minl 
do n = max2,max2+100 
if loline(n) >= upline(n) 
compute s = n 
' if loline{n) >= upline(n) 
' display 'apex at' s 
if loline(n) >= upline(n) 
break 
compute n = n + 1 
end do n 
if maxl>minl 
compute n = max2 + 1 
if maxl>minl 
while n <= s { 
if 0.97*x(n)>=upline(n) 
compute u = n 
if 1.03*x(n)<=loline(n) 
compute d = n 
i f  ( u > 0 ) . o r . ( d > 0 )  
display 'up signal at' u 'down signal at' d 
if (u > 0).or.(d > 0) 
branch loop6 
compute n = n + 1 
} 
display 'no signal' 
if maxl<minl 
compute n = maxl + 1 
if maxl>minl 
compute n = mini + 1 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
branch loopl 
loop6 
check increasing volume on up breakout. Down breakout has no volume 
criterion 
if u > 0 
compute avevol = (vol(u-10)+vol(u-9)+vol(u-8)+vol(u-7)+$ 
vol(u-6)+vol(u-5)+vol(u-4)+vol(u-3)+vol(u-2)+vol(u-1))/lO 
if (u > 0).and.(vol(u)<avevol) 
display 'u=' u 'volume did not confirm' 
if (u > 0).and.(vol(u)<avevol) 
compute u = 0 
find signal and profit if up breakout 
if u > 0 
compute signals = signals + 1 
if u > 0 
compute profit = 1000000*((x(n+10) - x(n))/x(n)) 
if u > 0 
compute pvalue = profit*(1 + (.0002844709*(8242 - n - 10))) 
140 
if u > 0 
display n profit pvalue 
if u > 0 
compute totalpv = totalpv + pvalue 
*find signal and profit if down breakout 
if d > 0 
compute signals = signals + 1 
if d > 0 
compute profit = 1000000*((x(n) - x(n+10))/x(n)) 
if d > 0 
compute pvalue = profit*(1 + (.0002844709*(8242 - n - 10))) 
if d > 0 
display n profit pvalue 
if d > 0 
compute totalpv = totalpv + pvalue 
if maxl<minl 
compute n = maxl + 1 
if maxl>minl 
compute n = mini + 1 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
branch loopl 
:loop? 
display 'hits =' hits 
display 'signals =' signals 
display 'totalpv =' totalpv 
end do i 
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APPENDIX D. RECTANGLE SIGNAL PROGRAM 
*This program will detect pattern and signal for rectangle 
•pattern 
cal(daily) 62 1 2 
all 0 93:8:3 
open data c:\martine\gm.prn 
data(format=free,org=obs) / gm vol 
set y / = gm 
*set X 60:1:4 93:7:7 = (y{t-2)+y(t-1)+y(t)+y{t+1)+y(t+2))/5 
set X 62:1:4 93:8:1 = (y(t-2)+y(t-1)+y(t)+y(t+1)+y(t+2))/5 
do i=l,2 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
compute signals = hits = 0 
compute totalpv = 0.0 
compute n = 5 
branch loopl 
•checking for max or min 
:loopl 
compute max = min = 0 
if (x(n) >= X(n+1)).and.(x(n) >= x(n-l)) .and. $ 
(x(n+l) >= x{n+2)).and.(x{n-l) >= x(n-2)) 
compute max = 1 
if (x(n) <= x(n+l)).and.(x(n) <= x(n-l)).and.$ 
(x(n+l) <= X(n+2)).and.(x(n-1) <= x(n-2)) 
compute min = 1 
if max == 1 
branch loop2 
if min == 1 
branch loop3 
compute n = n + 1 
if n == 8225 
* if n == 8730 
branch loop8 
branch loopl 
•finding consecutive maxima 
:loop2 
compute flag = 0 
if maxl == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute maxl = n 
if flag == 1 
compute n = n + 1 
if flag == 1 
branch loopl 
if max2 == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute max2 = n 
if (max2 > 0).and.(min2 > 0) 
branch loop4 
compute n = n + 1 
branch loopl 
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•finding consecutive minima 
:loop3 
compute flag = 0 
if mini == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag = = 1 
compute mini = n 
if flag == 1 
compute n = n + 1 
if flag == 1 
branch loopl 
if min2 == 0 
compute flag = 1 
if flag == 1 
compute min2 = n 
if (min2 > 0).and.(max2 > 0) 
branch loop4 
compute n = n + 1 
branch loopl 
:loop4 
•checking if maxima and minima alternate 
if (minl<maxl).and.(maxl<min2).and.(min2<max2).and.$ 
(x(minl)<x(maxl)) 
branch loop5 
if (maxl<minl).and.(minl<max2).and.(max2<min2).and.$ 
(x(mini)<x(maxl)) 
branch loop5 
•updating n 
if maxl<minl 
compute n = maxl + 1 
if maxl>minl 
compute n = mini + 1 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
branch loopl 
loop5 
construct lines and verify they have parallel, near-zero slope 
compute upslope = (x(max2) - x(maxl))/(max2 - maxl) 
compute loslope = (x(min2) - x(mini))/(min2 - mini) 
if (abs(upslope-loslope)<=0.05).and.(abs(loslope)<=0.05).and.$ 
( a b s ( u p s l o p e ) < = 0 . 0 5 )  
branch loop6 
updating n 
if maxl<minl 
compute n = maxl + 1 
if maxl>minl 
compute n = mini + 1 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
branch loopl 
loop6 
compute hits = hits + 1 
display 'rectangle found' 
display mini maxl min2 max2 'upslope' upslope 'loslope' loslope 
compute u = d = b = 0 
constructing lines to detect signal 
set m = t - maxl 
set upline = upslope*m + x(maxl) 
set p = t - mini 
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set loline = loslope*p + x(minl) 
*Finding break and signal in case where rectangle begins with max 
if maxl<ininl 
do n = min2,min2+50 
if y(n) > upline(n) 
compute b = n 
if y(n) < loline(n) 
compute b = n 
' if b > 0 
' display 'break at' b 
if b > 0 
break 
compute n = n + 1 
end do n 
if (maxl<minl).and.(b == 0) 
compute n = min2 + 1 
if (maxl<minl).and.(b == 0) 
display 'no break' 
if (maxl<minl).and.{b == 0) 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
if (maxl<minl).and.(b == 0) 
branch loopl 
if maxl<minl 
do n = min2,min2+50 
if 0.97*y(n)>=upline(n) 
compute u = n 
if 1.03*y(n)<=loline(n) 
compute d = n 
if (u > 0).or.(d > 0) 
display 'up signal at' u 'down signal at' d 
if (u > 0).or.(d > 0) 
branch loop? 
compute n = n + 1 
end do n 
*Finding break and signal in case where rectangle begins with min 
if maxl>minl 
do n = max2,max2+50 
if y(n) > upline(n) 
compute b = n 
if y(n) < loline(n) 
compute b = n 
if b > 0 
display 'break at' b 
if b > 0 
break 
compute n = n + 1 
end do n 
if (maxl>minl).and.(b == 0) 
compute n = max2 + 1 
if (maxl>minl).and.(b == 0) 
display 'no break' 
if (maxl>minl).and.(b == 0) 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
if (maxl>minl).and.(b == 0) 
branch loopl 
if maxl>minl 
do n = max2,max2+50 
if 0.97*y(n)>=upline(n) 
compute u = n 
if 1.03*y(n)<=loline(n) 
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compute d = n 
* if (u > 0).or.(d > 0) 
* display 'up signal at' u 'down signal at' d 
i f  ( u > 0 ) . o r . ( d > 0 )  
branch loop? 
compute n = n + 1 
end do n 
* display 'no signal' 
compute n = b 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = raax2 = 0 
branch loopl 
:loop? 
*check increasing volume on up breakout. Down breakout has no volume 
*criterion 
if u > 0 
compute avevol = (vol(u-lO)+vol(u-9)+vol(u-8)+vol(u-?)+$ 
vol(u-6)+vol(u-5)+vol(u-4)+vol(u-3)+vol(u-2)+vol(u-l))/lO 
* if (u > 0).and.(vol(u)<avevol) 
* display 'u=' u 'volume did not confirm' 
if (u > 0).and.(vol(u)<avevol) 
compute u = 0 
*find signal and returns if up breakout 
i f  ( u > 0 ) . o r . ( d > 0 )  
compute signals = signals + 1 
if u > 0 
compute profit = 1000000*((y(n+10) - y(n))/y(n)) 
if u > 0 
compute pvalue = profit*(l + ( .000061?24*(8241 -
if u > 0 
display n profit pvalue 
if u > 0 
compute totalpv = totalpv + pvalue 
*find retunrs if down ! breakout 
if d > 0 
compute profit = 1000000*((y(n) - y(n+10))/y(n)) 
if d > 0 
compute pvalue = profit*(l + ( .000061?24*(8241 -
if d > 0 
display n profit pvalue 
if d > 0 
compute totalpv : = totalpv + pvalue 
* update n 
compute n = b 
compute mini = min2 = maxl = max2 = 0 
branch loopl 
;loops 
display 'hits =' hits 
display 'signals =' signals 
display 'totalpv =' totalpv 
end do i 
